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1 SO WE WILL NEVER FORGET
This report provides the findings of a nationwide, population-based survey conducted in Cambodia 
from 9 September to 1 October 2008. Teams of interviewers used a structured questionnaire to 
interview 1,000 Cambodians 18 years old or older.  The primary objectives of the study were to
 
•	 measure	public	awareness	of	the	Extraordinary	Chambers	in	the	Courts	of	Cambodia	(ECCC);	
•	 assess	 the	desire	 for	 justice	and	 reparations	 for	 crimes	 committed	by	 the	Khmer	Rouge	 from	1975 
to 1979;	
•	 determine	 the	 level	of	access	Cambodians	have	had	 to	 the	ECCC	and	 the	national	 criminal	 justice	 
system;	and	
•	 recommend	ways	in	which	the	ECCC,	the	Cambodian	government,	civil	society,	and	the	international	 
community can ensure that Cambodians become engaged participants in—and not merely auxiliaries 
to—the work of the court.
For the survey, researchers randomly selected 125 communes out of 1,621 using systematic random 
sampling proportionate to population size. At least one commune was then selected in each of the 
24 provinces of Cambodia. Next, researchers randomly selected two villages from each commune, 
resulting in a sample of 250 villages. Within each village, four households were randomly selected 
using linear systematic sampling with equal probability of selection. Within each household, a Kish 
grid was used to select at random one household member to interview. Finally, researchers analyzed 
the data using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 16.0. Further information 
about the survey methodology and limitations is provided in the Introduction.
By the time of the survey, the ECCC had arrested and charged five former leaders of the Khmer 
Rouge. The first to be taken into custody, in July 2007, was Kaing Guek Eav (Duch), former head 
of the notorious Tuol Sleng prison (also known as S21). He was later charged with crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. By late 2007, four other suspects had been detained and charged with 
similar crimes: Ieng Sary, Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea, 
the	name	given	to	Cambodia	by	the	Khmer	Rouge	regime;	Nuon	Chea,	known	as	“Brother	Number	Two”	 
and	 second-in-command	 to	 the	Khmer	Rouge	 leader	 Pol	 Pot;	Khieu	 Samphan,	 President	 of	Democratic	 
Kampuchea;	 and	 Ieng	 Thirith,	 Minister	 of	 Social	 Affairs	 of	 Democratic	 Kampuchea.	 The	 first	 to	 
stand trial will be Kaing Guek Eav and proceedings are expected to begin in February-March 2009. 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Our principal findings are summarized as follows:
ExpOSuRE TO VIOLENcE
Eighty percent of respondents in our survey 
considered themselves to be victims of the Khmer 
Rouge. Nearly all those who lived under the 
Khmer Rouge regime identified themselves as 
victims (93%), while half (51%) of those who 
did not live under the regime said they were 
victims. Among respondents who lived under the 
Khmer Rouge regime, over two-thirds reported 
having experienced starvation/lack of food (82%), 
lack of shelter (71%), personal property stolen 
or destroyed (71%), and forced evacuation (69%). 
Approximately one in four respondents reported 
having been tortured (27%) or having witnessed 
torture (30%) or killings (22%). Sixty-three 
percent said they had been forced to perform 
labor. Respondents who lived under the Khmer 
Rouge regime were significantly more likely to 
have been exposed to violent events. 
OVERaLL pRIORITIES
Respondents said their priorities were jobs (83%) 
and services to meet basic needs including health 
(20%) and food (17%). When asked what the 
priorities of the government should be, justice 
was seldom mentioned (2%), with the most frequent answers being the economy (56%) and building 
infrastructure (48%). When given more specific choices among priorities, three out of four 
respondents (76%) said it was more important to focus on problems that Cambodians face in their 
daily lives rather than address crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime. 
KNOWLEdGE OF ThE KhmER ROuGE
Nearly thirty years after the end of the Khmer Rouge regime, two-thirds of the population of 
Cambodia never directly experienced the violence and abuses of that period: 68 percent of the 
population is 29 years old or younger. Eight-one percent of respondents in our survey who did not 
live under the Khmer Rouge regime described their knowledge of that period as poor or very poor. 
Most (84%) said their main source of information about the Khmer Rouge was from families 
and friends, while only 6 percent said they acquired it in school. Seventy-seven percent of all 
respondents said they wanted to know more about what had happened during the Khmer Rouge 
regime, while 85 percent of those who did not live under the regime wanted to learn more. 
SuRVEy RESpONdENTS
The average age of survey respondents 
was 39.8 years old (standard deviation, 
13.8 years), with equal numbers of male 
and female. A majority of respondents 
were Khmer (95%). Three out of four 
respondents (74%) had at least some 
primary education. Seventy-one percent 
reported being literate in at least one 
language. 
Over two-thirds of respondents (69%) 
reported they had lived under the Khmer 
Rouge regime, while 31 percent said they 
were born after it had left power. We 
found statistically significant differences 
between these two groups on a range of 
topics regarding the ECCC and the need 
for justice and accountability. This suggests 
that outreach programs for the ECCC 
should be tailored to reflect the needs 
of these two subgroups.
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LIVING WITh FORmER mEmbERS OF ThE KhmER ROuGE
The vast majority of respondents said they still harbored feelings of hatred towards those Khmer Rouge 
members responsible for violent acts. Seventy-one percent said they wanted to see the Khmer Rouge 
suffer in some way. A third said they wished they could take revenge (37%) against former Khmer Rouge 
and that they would do so if they had the opportunity (40%). Forty-seven percent said they were 
uncomfortable living in the same community with former Khmer Rouge members. However, one-third 
of respondents (36%) said they had forgiven the Khmer Rouge. Feelings of hatred were more frequent 
among those who lived under the Khmer Rouge regime compared to those who did not. Likewise, 
forgiveness was less frequent among those who lived under the Khmer Rouge regime compared to 
those who did not.
accOuNTabILITy
Nine out of ten respondents in our survey said that members of the Khmer Rouge should be held 
accountable for the crimes they committed. When asked to specify who should be held accountable, 
half (51%) mentioned Khmer Rouge leaders or officials, and 20 percent mentioned the Khmer Rouge 
regime in general. One-quarter (24%) identified Pol Pot, the deceased Khmer Rouge leader, while 
11 percent mentioned one or more of the five Khmer Rouge leaders currently in custody. Forty-nine 
percent of respondents said Khmer Rouge who committed crimes should be tried in a court of law. 
When asked who should be in charge of holding these individuals accountable, respondents said 
the current Cambodian government (58%), the international community (18%), the national judicial 
system (17%), and the ECCC (9%). 
ExTRaORdINaRy chambERS IN ThE cOuRTS OF cambOdIa 
•	 Knowledge of the ECCC. Thirty-nine percent of the respondents in our survey had no knowledge 
of the ECCC, and nearly half (46%) had only limited knowledge. Among those who had some 
level of knowledge about the ECCC, 53 percent adequately described it as a hybrid court 
comprising national and international judges and staff. However, 82 percent of these respondents 
were unable to name all five accused currently awaiting trial. Of those who had heard about 
the ECCC the main sources of information were radio (80%) and television (44%). Twenty-eight 
percent of these respondents reported having seen specific TV programs about the ECCC, most 
frequently news reports (45%) and soap operas (16%). The vast majority (98%) said they would 
watch the ECCC proceedings if they were broadcasted live on TV. Finally, less than 1 percent of 
those respondents who had lived under the Khmer Rouge regime had participated in an outreach 
activity related to the ECCC over the twelve-month period prior to the survey.
•	 Perceptions and Expectations of the ECCC. In general, those respondents who were aware of the 
ECCC gave it very high marks. Eighty-seven percent said the court would respond to the crimes 
committed by the Khmer Rouge. About two-thirds (67%) believed the ECCC judges would be fair 
and the court was neutral. Sixty-eight percent believed the ECCC would have a positive effect on 
the victims of the Khmer Rouge and their families. However, there was ambiguity among some 
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respondents about the court’s objectivity and integrity. One-third said the court was not neutral 
and, among them,  23 percent felt it was corrupt. Respondents had high expectations of the ECCC. 
Of	 those	 respondents	 who	 had	 “a	 little	 knowledge”	 of	 the	 ECCC,	 26 percent said the court 
would bring justice and 20 percent said the court would punish the guilty. However, 37 percent 
did not know what the ECCC would accomplish.   
•	 Recommendations to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Respondents 
who had at least some knowledge of the court were given the opportunity to make one 
recommendation to the ECCC. Consistent with their perceptions and expectations, respondents 
wanted the court to speed up the trials (30%) and for it to be fair and independent (22%). 
Seventeen percent said they did not know what to recommend to the court.
•	 Reparations. ECCC judges have the authority to rule that reparations of a collective, symbolic, 
and moral—but not financial—nature be provided to certain groups of victims (i.e., civil parties). 
Such reparations could include erecting statues, building memorials, renaming public facilities, 
establishing days of remembrance, expunging criminal records, issuing declarations of death, 
exhuming bodies, and conducting reburials. The vast majority of our respondents (88%) said 
reparations should be provided to victims of the Khmer Rouge, and that they should be provided 
to the community as a whole (68%). Over half (53%) said reparations should be in a form 
that affects the daily lives of Cambodians, including social services (20%), infrastructure 
development (15%), economic development programs (12%), housing and land (5%), and 
provision of livestock, food, and agriculture tools (1%).
NaTIONaL cRImINaL JuSTIcE SySTEm
Respondents showed little confidence in the national criminal justice system. Only 36 percent said 
they trusted it, and a slightly higher number (37%) said they trusted Cambodian judges. Less than 
half of respondents (44%) agreed with the proposition that Cambodian justice is for everyone, 
or that Cambodian judges treat everyone equally (40%). Eighty-two percent said going to court 
was too expensive and required bribing judges (82%) or the police (77%).
Key recommendations to emerge from our findings are as follows:
TO THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMbERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMbODIA
•	 Deal immediately and effectively with allegations of corruption and lack of transparency at the 
ECCC. Among Cambodians who are knowledgeable of the ECCC, there is strong support for its 
work. Survey respondents expressed high expectations that the court will be fair and independent. 
This is good news for the ECCC, but it could easily erode if allegations of corruption continue. 
Respondents showed little confidence in the national criminal justice system because of corruption 
and a lack of trust in court officials. The ECCC should not succumb to the same fate. Moreover, 
the court should ensure that trials are transparent and conducted in a timely fashion.
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•	 Greatly expand and improve the outreach efforts of the ECCC. Knowledge of the ECCC nationwide 
should be much higher at this point in time, given that it became operational in 2006. Less than 
1 percent of those who lived under the Khmer Rouge (four individuals) had participated in 
an ECCC-related outreach activity during the 12 months prior to the survey. Public service 
announcements about the court should be broadcast on radio and television. Interviews with 
court judges and staff should be commonplace during the trials to help explain complicated legal 
and judicial concepts to the public. Finally, a weekly summary of trial proceedings—preferably in 
a talk show format that encourages debate—should be aired on both radio and television.
•	 Appoint a staff member to serve as an “educational liaison officer” to donors, nongovernmental 
organizations, and the Cambodian government. The ECCC’s primary obligation, as with all courts, 
is to hold fair and public trials. That said, the court is in a unique position to act as a catalyst for 
educational programs that will connect the court’s activities to Cambodian history. Cambodia’s 
school system has failed to educate young people about the crimes of the Khmer Rouge. Working 
together, the ECCC, donors, nongovernmental organizations, and Ministry of Education should use 
this unprecedented opportunity to create curricular modules combining historical texts and visual 
materials from the forthcoming trials for use in primary and secondary schools. These educational 
products could also serve as part of the court’s legacy. 
•	 Recognize that the vast majority of Cambodians view themselves as direct or indirect victims of 
the Khmer Rouge and desire some form of collective and symbolic reparations. Why this is a pressing 
issue for the ECCC is reflected in the finding that most respondents said it was more important for 
the country to focus on problems Cambodians face in their daily lives than the crimes committed 
by the Khmer Rouge. This suggests that the ECCC must find ways to ground its activities in the 
current concerns and needs of the population. Providing reparations—especially those aimed at 
providing social services and infrastructure development—could help meet this need.
TO DONORS AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
•	 Find ways to help the ECCC better inform Cambodians about its mandate and activities. Donors 
and nongovernmental organizations have played a critical role in supporting the ECCC on many 
levels, including outreach and training. Yet the data suggests most Cambodians are not aware of 
the court or know very little about its mandate and procedures. It also appears that outreach efforts 
have not been well coordinated. A centralized process with clear guidelines and goals could help 
remedy this situation. 
•	 Continue to provide support to the ECCC in defining what reparations will work in the Cambodian 
context. As noted earlier, Cambodians favor especially those reparations that affect their daily lives. 
One workshop has already been convened in late November 2007 focusing on the history of 
reparations following mass violence and reparations that have worked in post-war settings. 
A follow-up workshop could focus on how to provide victims and their families a voice in the 
process of determining the most appropriate reparations and how to deliver reparations in an 
effective manner. 
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•	 Develop a comprehensive plan for promoting discussion in communities where tensions between 
former Khmer Rouge members and the general population are known to be high. The survey 
data suggest that a degree of unspoken hostility lingers in some Cambodian communities over the 
crimes of the Khmer Rouge. Studies in other post-war settings indicate trials can further divide 
communities that have not reconciled their differences. To mitigate the possibility of escalating 
tensions, community-based discussion should be held before and after ECCC judges render 
their verdicts.
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CAMbODIA
•	 Conduct a major review and overhaul of the national criminal justice system that integrates the 
judicial legacy of the ECCC, ends corruption, and institutes transparency, accountability, and 
efficacy. The survey data are clear: Cambodians have little faith in their criminal justice system. 
The ECCC’s presence could provide the opportunity for donors, nongovernmental organizations, 
and the Government of Cambodia to come together and tackle this problem in a meaningful and 
sustainable way. For respondents, justice meant uncovering truth and being fair, enforcing and 
respecting existing laws, and knowing who is right and wrong. Only a few reported that they rely 
on the legal system when faced with disputes. 
•	 Continue to work with the civil society to integrate what happened during the Khmer Rouge 
regime into school history curriculum. As mentioned earlier, Cambodia’s school system has thus 
far failed to educate young people about the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime.
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After a decade of negotiations leading to the adoption of its internal rules in June 2007, the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is the first serious effort to bring the law 
to bear, however belatedly and incompletely, on the horrendous crimes committed by leaders of the 
Khmer Rouge more than a quarter of a century ago. In power for just under four years (1975 to 1979), 
the Khmer Rouge more than decimated Cambodia. At least 1.7 million Cambodians, fully one quarter 
of the population, were killed or died as a result of the oppressive policies imposed by the Khmer Rouge, 
with execution, starvation, exhaustion from slave labor, malnutrition, and torture as the leading 
causes of death. 
The ECCC faces several serious challenges.1 First, as the latest in a series of tribunals—starting with 
Nuremberg and culminating most recently with the International Criminal Court—it faces the 
daunting task of securing criminal accountability for mass atrocities. Supporters and skeptics alike 
are scrutinizing the ECCC’s performance and judicial legacy. Should it be marred by incompetence, 
corruption, or political interference or fail to comply with international due process standards, it could 
jeopardize further attempts to root international justice principles in domestic legal systems. 
Second, the ECCC must contend with the passage of time and its tendency to erode the probative value 
of evidence. The ECCC is investigating and will soon adjudicate alleged crimes committed over thirty 
years	ago.	This	 is	complicated	 for	any	court,	 especially	a	“hybrid	court”	 that	combines	both	national	 
and international legal standards and procedures on the admission of evidence. How will the passage 
of time have affected the memories of witnesses or their willingness to testify? Can documents 
linking the accused to the elements of the alleged crimes be secured and verified, and withstand 
judicial scrutiny? Will the health and age of the five accused affect their ability to stand the rigors of 
a trial? What will a trial 30 years later mean for survivors?
1. INTRODUCTION
1	 See	James	A.	Goldston,	“An	Extraordinary	Experiment	in	Transitional	Justice,”	in	Justice Initiatives (New York: Open Society 
Institute, Spring 2006), 1–6.
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Third, it is likely that the ECCC will be the last and only hope for victims of the Khmer Rouge regime 
to receive formal acknowledgement and recognition of the grave injustices and losses they have 
suffered. In recent years, Cambodian human rights organizations have amassed an impressive amount 
of documentation and testimony about the Khmer Rouge period. Yet no serious and systematic 
attempt has been made to establish a truth-seeking process or other mechanisms for addressing past 
crimes. Nor have there been any purely domestic trials, beyond the clearly substandard proceedings 
convened in the immediate aftermath of the Khmer Rouge’s fall. 
Fourth, the ECCC faces several internal challenges, including allegations of corruption and lack of 
independence, transparency, and funding. Since its early beginning, the ECCC has been plagued with 
allegations of corruption, especially kickbacks on salaries of national staff.2 Many human rights 
organizations have raised concerns regarding the potential interference of the government in the ECCC.3 
Lack of funding has also been a recurring issue, in part because some critical items were not 
included in the initial budget. Set at $56 million over three years, it is now estimated that $135.4 
million will be necessary through the end of 2010. Several states have already contributed or pledged 
funds. However, funding will remain on the agenda for the years to come. All of those issues, 
as well as the overwhelming amount and quality of translation and difficulty in hiring skilled staff 
have hindered the work of the court and caused delays.
Finally, the ECCC faces the exigencies of great expectations. International and national observers 
have opined that the court has the potential to establish a more complete historical record of the 
Khmer Rouge regime and reform Cambodia’s judicial system. As a prominent Cambodian human rights 
advocate	 argued	 in	 2006:	 “Judges	 [in	 Cambodia]	 can	 learn	 from	 the	 international	 process—from	 
[the	 ECCC’s]	 international	 judges	 and	 their	 codes	 of	 conduct.	 People	 may	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 
watch a fair trial and compare it with the trials they have seen in the past, and in the future. If there 
is a good strategy as to how to introduce the lessons from the court into the Cambodian judiciary, 
it is to record it, to transcribe it, and to have Cambodian lawyers and judges review this process and 
examine	 the	 record,	 to	 train	 them.”4 Whether or not this expectation can be met will depend heavily 
on the ECCC’s performance, the Cambodian government’s willingness to institute sweeping judicial 
reforms, and the extent to which donor governments will continue to bankroll legal programs. 
   
2	 Open	 Society	 Justice	 Initiative,	 “Progress	 and	Challenges	 at	 the	 Extraordinary	Chambers	 in	 the	Courts	 of	Cambodia”	 
(Phnom Penh, Cambodia: The Open Society Institute, June 2007).
3	 For	example,	see	Human	Rights	Watch,	“Cambodia:	Government	Interferes	in	Khmer	Rouge	Tribunal,”	5	December	2006,	 
available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/05/cambod14752.htm.
4	 See	 interview	with	Thun	Saray,	President	of	 the	Cambodian	Human	Rights	and	Development	Association,	 in	“No	Perfect	
Justice,”	in	Justice Initiatives (New York: Open Society Institute, Spring 2006), 111.
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ThE SuRVEy
Against this background, the UC Berkeley Human Rights Center and its Initiative for Vulnerable 
Populations conducted a population-based survey in Cambodia to capture opinions and attitudes 
about accountability, social reconstruction, and the ECCC. Researchers interviewed 1,000 adult 
Cambodians from 9 September to 1 October 2008 with the following objectives: 
1. To measure public awareness of the ECCC and outreach and victim participation programs 
initiated	by	the	court	and	local	nongovernmental	organizations;
2. To capture attitudes about the Khmer Rouge regime and the desire for justice and reparations for 
past	crimes;
3. To assess knowledge about and the level of access of Cambodians to the national criminal justice 
system;	and
4. To recommend ways in which the ECCC, Cambodian judicial and administrative institutions, 
civil society, and the international community can ensure that Cambodians become engaged 
participants in—and not merely auxiliaries to—the work of the court.
mEThOdOLOGy
Respondents for the survey were randomly selected among all adults (18 years of age or older) 
who are residents of Cambodia. A four-stage cluster sampling strategy was designed to ensure that 
results would be representative of this population. The sampling frame used for the survey was the 
Cambodia General Population Census 2008 Village’s database prepared by the National Institute of 
Statistics, Ministry of Planning.5 
The survey took place in two stages. During the first stage, researchers randomly selected 125 communes 
out of 1,621 using systematic random sampling proportionate to population size.6 At least one commune 
was selected in each of the 24 provinces of Cambodia. During the second stage, researchers randomly 
selected two villages from each commune using a simple random sampling procedure proportionate to 
population size, resulting in a sample of 250 villages. Within each village, four households were 
randomly selected using linear systematic sampling with equal probability of selection. Finally, within 
each household, a Kish grid was used to select one household member at random for an interview.7 
The total expected sample size was 1,000 individuals. 
5 See http://www.stats.nis.gov.kh/index.htm.
6 Communes (Khum) are an administrative division regrouping villages.
7 The Kish grid is a selection method in which all eligible participants are ordered by sex and age and assigned a number. 
Interviewers use a selection table to randomly select a number and the corresponding eligible participant is interviewed. 
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Interviewers attempted to contact randomly selected respondents three times over the course of a day. 
If a selected respondent could not be interviewed or refused to participate, the next randomly selected 
respondent was approached. 











Data Source: National Institute of Statistics, 
 Cambodia, Map by Vinck P.
Phnom
Penh
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One-on-one interviews were conducted anonymously in a confidential setting at or near respondents’ 
dwellings. A standard consent form was used to present the project (i.e., university-based research not 
affiliated with the government), stress the confidentiality of the responses, and inform respondents of 
the voluntary nature of their participation (i.e., no compensation was provided, they were given the 
option to refuse to answer or stop the interview at any time).8
Interviewers	 used	 a	 structured	 questionnaire	 covering	 nine	 topics	 including	 (1)	 demographics;	 
(2)	 needs	 and	priorities;	 (3)	 justice	 and	 rule	 of	 law;	 (4)	 the	Khmer	Rouge	 regime;	 (5)	 the	ECCC’s	 
outreach	efforts;	(6)	knowledge,	attitudes,	and	perceptions	of	the	ECCC;	(7)	establishing	a	historical	 
record,	 truth	 telling,	 and	 reparations;	 (8)	 exposure	 to	 violence;	 and	 (9)	mental	 health	 (results	 not	 
discussed in this report). The instrument was first developed in English and then translated into 
Khmer. Back-translation and consultation with local experts ensured the quality of the translation. 
The questionnaire was pre-tested with 60 randomly selected respondents in non-study sites to ensure 
that the instrument was culturally adapted and easily understandable to respondents. 
The data collection was conducted in partnership with the Center for Advanced Study, a Cambodian-
based, nonprofit survey research organization. A total of 25 experienced Cambodian interviewers and 
supervisors organized in five teams conducted the interviews. The interviewers and supervisors 
participated	 in	 a	 five-day	 training	 to	 familiarize	 themselves	 with	 the	 questionnaire;	 interview	 
techniques,	 including	 non-suggestive	 probing;	 and	 selection	 of	 respondents.	 The	 training	 included	 
discussion of the study objectives and concepts, mock interviews, and survey pilot. This procedure 
enabled trainers to improve the survey instrument and identify and improve the weaknesses of 
interviewers. In the field, supervisors provided oversight to ensure proper execution of household 
sampling procedures, as well as uniform application of the research protocol. To reduce data collection 
errors, interviewers checked the survey instrument for completeness and entry errors before leaving 
the selected household. A second check was performed by the supervisor. The average estimated 
interview time per questionnaire was one hour and forty-five minutes. Finally, researchers analyzed 
data using the Statistical Package for Social Science version 16.0.
LImITaTIONS OF ThE STudy
While the study was conducted as rigorously as possible, some limitations must be acknowledged. 
First, the survey contained questions related to events that took place over 30 years ago. For respondents, 
the passage of time could have resulted in recall errors or created certain biases. However, we developed 
several questions to test the validity of their responses. These questions are discussed in further detail 
in the results and the discussion sections below. 
8 The study protocol was reviewed and approved by the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects of the University 
of California, Berkeley. The Cambodian Ministry of Interior and local authorities in sampled villages approved the study 
but were not involved in the design of the study or in the analysis and presentation of the results. 
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Second, while three attempts were made to contact selected respondents, not all selected individuals 
could be interviewed due to the limited time spent in each village. In the end, 147 households (13% of 
all households) had to be replaced because no one was home (76%), no one was eligible (14%), 
all members refused to be interviewed (5%), or no one was available (5%). In addition, within selected 
households, 297 individuals (23%) had to be replaced by the next randomly selected individual 
within the same household because the respondent was not home (85%), refused to participate in the 
interview (13%) or because the interview could not be completed (2%). 
Third, the data collection for the survey started on 9 September 2008, two weeks after Co-Prosecutors 
appealed	the	Closing	Order	of	 the	trial	of	Kaing	Guek-Eav	(alias	“Duch”)	 issued	by	the	Co-Investigating	 
Judges on 12 August 2008. The delay caused by the appeal may affect how respondents view the 
ECCC. Because views and attitudes are influenced by local and contemporaneous events (such as 
media coverage), the views expressed in this report present only a snapshot at the time of the survey. 
Finally, while the survey questions were finalized following piloting and in-depth consultations with 
local experts on terminology, respondents were free to interpret the questions according to their 
own perceptions of the terms used. Careful choice of phrasing and translation reduced the risk of 
misinterpretation of the questions. 
ORGaNIzaTION OF ThE REpORT
The remainder of the report consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 provides background on the rise and 
fall of the Khmer Rouge, the establishment of the ECCC, and the role of local nongovernmental 
organizations in court-related activities. Chapter 3 sets out the demographics for the survey. Chapter 4 
examines how survey respondents experienced and perceived the Khmer Rouge regime, as well as 
their knowledge of its policies. Chapters 5 and 6 present respondents’ views about the need for justice 
and truth telling and their attitudes about the ECCC. And, finally, Chapter 7 presents our conclusions 
and recommendations. These are also summarized in the Executive Summary.
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The years of the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979 mark one of the most horrific times in 
modern history. Nearly one quarter of the Cambodia population—a least 1.7 million people—perished 
as a result of the oppressive polices imposed by Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot and his cronies.9 
Professionals and educated persons, especially teachers, doctors, police, and former government 
officials—viewed by the Khmer Rouge as objects of Western decadence—were singled out for 
persecution. Throughout Cambodia, anyone who questioned the supremacy of the Khmer Rouge or 
committed the slightest infraction could be summarily executed or sent to one of a dozen or more 
prison camps where torture was routine.
Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) was born into a well-to-do Cambodian farming family in 1925, in an area then 
part of French Indochina. At the age of twenty-four, he traveled to Paris to study radio electricity 
and became heavily influenced by Marxism and Maoism. Pol Pot returned to Cambodia in 1953 and 
subsequently became the leader of the Cambodian communist movement10 popularly known as 
Khmer Rouge. After the anti-left campaign led by Sihanouk put him at risk of arrest, Pol Pot retreated 
into the jungle where he started to establish clandestine guerilla bases. By 1970, a full-fledged civil war 
descended on the country.11 On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge troops seized control of the capital, 
Phnom Penh, marking the beginning of 3 years, 8 months and 20 days of an attempt to transform 
Cambodian society into an agrarian utopia.
Pol Pot’s first action was to force the population out of the cities and towns and into the countryside. 
He and his top leaders established a society based on agriculture and total collectivism. The Angkar 
or	 “Organization,”	 as	 the	 revolutionary	movement	 named	 itself,	was	 the	 sole	 governing	 power	 and	 
the owner of all means of production and private property. Cambodia was renamed Democratic 
Kampuchea (DK).
2. bACKGROUND
9 See Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge 1975-1979 
(New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2002).
10	 Stephen	J.	Morris,	“Vietnam	and	Cambodian	Communism,”	in	Khmer Rouge History & Authors: From Stalin to Pol Pot - 
Towards a Description of the Pol Pot Regime (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: ADHOC and Center for Social Development, 
January 2007), 2.
11	 See	Dawn	Kelly	Askin,	“Prosecuting	Senior	Leaders	of	Khmer	Rouge	Crimes,”	in	Justice Initiative (New York: Open Society 
Institute, Spring 2006), 72–73.
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Cambodia was effectively sealed off from the outside world.12 The Khmer Rouge expelled all 
foreigners, closed embassies, banned the use of foreign languages, and refused any foreign economic 
or medical assistance.13 Newspapers and television stations were shut down, radios and bicycles 
confiscated, currency and the postal system were abolished and telephone usage curtailed.14 All 
businesses were shuttered, religion banned, education halted, health care eliminated, and parental 
authority revoked.15 
Angkar’s polices were largely uniform across the country with some regional16 and individual 
variations.	Officially,	there	was	no	class	but	in	practice	all	Cambodians	were	labeled	as	either	“Old	or	 
Base	People”	or	“New	People.”	Old	People	were	 those	who	 resided	 in	areas	 controlled	by	 the	Khmer	
Rouge prior to 1975, while New People were mostly city dwellers, including peasants in the cities at 
the time of the evacuation.17 People from the city had been exposed to foreign influences and were 
considered politically unreliable. Most of them were put to work in forced labor camps throughout 
the country. Millions of Cambodians were forced into slave labor where they began dying from 
overwork, disease, and malnutrition.
To enforce their drastic changes, the Khmer Rouge created and maintained a climate of constant 
terror, violence, and secrecy. They also instituted a vast prison system across the country.18 The most 
infamous prison was Tuol Sleng in Phnom Penh where thousands of people were tortured and later 
executed. Broad cohorts of the population were marked for extermination. Educated urban elite, 
soldiers from previous regimes, Buddhist monks, Cambodians returning from overseas and ethnic 
populations such as Chams, Khmer of Vietnamese origin, and Chinese were eliminated. As the 
leaders’ obsession with potential infiltration and treason increased, the regime conducted major 
purges among their own ranks, torturing and killing countless of innocent victims.19 
After several years of border wars, the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. On January 7, 1979, the 
Pol Pot regime collapsed, overthrown by the Vietnamese. More than 300,000 Cambodians fled to 
Thailand or Vietnam. Pol Pot and some 30,000 to 50,000 supporters, including most of its army, 
fled to remote areas in north and west Cambodia.20
12 David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia	 (Boulder,	Colorado:	Westview	 Press,	 1983),	 209–11;	 Evan	Gottesman,	 
Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge. Inside the Politics of Nation Building (New Haven: Yale University, 2003), 24–25.
13	 Library	of	Congress,	Cambodia:	A	Country	 Study,	Washington	D.C.:	GPO	 for	 the	Library	of	Congress,	 1990;	Columbia	 
Encyclopedia,	6th	ED.,	2005;	Gottesman,	Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, 25.
14 Ibid.
15 Library of Congress.
16 Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 211.
17 Michael Vickery, Cambodia 1975– 1982 (Boston MA: South End Press, 1984), 81–82.
18	Henri	Locard,	“The	Khmer	Rouge	Prison	System,”	in	Khmer Rouge History & Authors: From Stalin to Pol Pot - Towards 
a Description of the Pol Pot Regime (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: ADHOC and Center for Social Development, January 2007).
19 Chandler, A History of Cambodia,	213;	218–19.
20 Ibid., 192.
15 SO WE WILL NEVER FORGET
The Vietnamese installed a pro-Vietnamese government, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) 
led by Heng Samrin. Cambodia entered a period of reconstruction hindered by a resistance movement 
at the Thai border21 and the isolation of Cambodia by the international community.
In September 1989, under international pressures, the Vietnamese finally withdrew their troops.22 
After a decade of negotiations, in 1991, all factions (government and resistance, including the Khmer 
Rouge) signed the Paris Peace Agreement. The signing of this accord marked the beginning of the 
operations of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The mission led to 
an election in 1993 and repatriation of more than 350,000 Cambodians from Thai refugee camps.23 
However, it did not succeed in disarming the factions or rallying the Khmer Rouge who refused to 
participate in the elections. The Khmer Rouge continued their resistance and guerilla warfare until 
1998 when the revolutionary movement collapsed.
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Based	 on	 the	 French	model	 of	 “civil	 law,”	 the	 Cambodian	 judicial	 system	was	 disrupted	 during	 the	 
civil war and was nonexistent during the Khmer Rouge regime. Today, despite some gains and 
improvements, the judiciary system has been criticized for its lack of independence, incompetence, and 
corruption.24 The situation is exacerbated by a confused legal framework and lack of resources. 
In rural areas, people often prefer to solve their problems within their community.25 People take 
matters into their own hands, or use a third party, or conciliator, as mediator. In general, people try to 
avoid courts arguing that they are costly and involve transportation, accommodations, and bribes to 
civil servants and judges. People trust the law but not the officers of the court.26
Rooted	 in	a	“culture	of	 impunity”	and	patronage,	 the	major	problems	of	 the	 legal	and	 judiciary	system	 
are corruption and absence of independence.27 The Ministry of Justice often provides instructions 
to	 judges	 on	how	 to	 interpret	 the	 laws;	 the	Executive	 pressures	 the	 court	 to	 overturn	 their	 rulings;28 
21 Three factions allied to fight the Vietnamese: Norodom Sihanouk’s United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, 
Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), Son Sann’s Kampuchean People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), 
and the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (the Khmer Rouge army) represented by Khieu Samphan.
22 Raoul M. Jennar, The Cambodian Constitutions (1953-1993) (Bangkok, Thailand: White Lotus, 1995), 111.
23 Raoul M. Jennar, Les Cles Du Cambodge (Excerpts), available at  http://vorasith.online.fr/cambodge/livres/cles.htm.
24 Center for International Development & Conflict Management, Polity IV Country Report 2003: Cambodia, available at 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/report.htm.
25	 For	 additional	 information	 on	 local	 conflicts	 management,	 see	 Fabienne	 Luco,	 “Between	 a	 Tiger	 and	 a	 Crocodile”	 
(Phnom Penh, Cambodia: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), September 2002), 
97–116.
26 Ibid.,144.
27	 Peter	 Leuprecht,	 “Continuing	 Patterns	 of	 Impunity	 in	 Cambodia”	 (Phnom	 Penh,	 Cambodia:	 United	 Nations	 Cambodia	 
Office	 of	 the	 High	 Commissioner	 for	 Human	 Rights,	 October	 2005),	 26;	 The	 Court	 Watch	 Project,	 “Annual	 Report”	 
(Phnom Penh: Center for Social Development, March 2008), 6.
28	 “National	Integrity	Systems.	Country	Study	Report”	(Cambodia:	Transparency	International,	2006),	23.
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selection, appointment, and promotion of judges are determined by the executive or legislative and 
political	 parties;29 and judges are often closely associated with the ruling Party30 making it difficult 
to separate Executive and Judiciary powers.
The judiciary and legal system is considered one of the most corrupt and least trustworthy institutions 
in Cambodia.31 In 2003, a survey conducted by the Center for Advanced Study showed that 
Cambodians have little or no faith in the Cambodian courts or its officials.32 The absence of rules on 
conflict of interest, on requirements to disclose assets or gifts, and on protection of whistleblowers 
heightens the possibilities of corruption.33
The capacity of the judicial system is clearly lacking.34 In 2007, Cambodia had only 142 judges, 72 
prosecutors, and 601 court clerks for 23 courts including the Appeals and Supreme Courts. Officers 
of the court are poorly trained. The budget for the courts is only a small fraction of the national 
budget35 leading to understaffing and a lack of space and basic necessities. In 2003, judicial 
remuneration was the lowest in Southeast Asia and the second most bureaucratically embedded 
judiciary in the region.36
THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMbERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMbODIA
The ECCC, also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, began its work on July 1, 2006, after 10 years 
of negotiations between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia, a process that 
involved multiple actors and several states.37 Its jurisdiction covers senior leaders and those most 
responsible for crimes and serious violations committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 
6 January 1979. The subject matter jurisdiction of the ECCC includes genocide, crimes against 
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and other crimes.38 










37	 For	 details	 on	 the	 negotiations	 see	Craig	Etcheson,	 “A	“Fair	 and	 Public	Trial”:	A	 Political	History	 of	 the	Extraordinary	 
Chambers,”	 in	The Extraordinary Chambers, ed. Open Society Justice Initiative (New York: Open Society Institute, 
Spring 2006).
38	Genocide	 is	defined	 in	 the	1948	Convention	on	 the	Prevention	and	Punishment	of	 the	Crime	of	Genocide;	crimes	against	 
humanity are defined in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and grave breaches of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and other crimes are defined in Chapter II of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers promulgated on 10 August 2001.
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Developed as a hybrid court within the Cambodian Court System, the ECCC is a mix of Cambodian 
and international judges with a majority of Cambodians. The court includes three Chambers: the 
Pre-Trial Chamber (5 judges), the Trial Chamber (5 judges), and the Supreme Court Chamber (7 judges). 
The Pre-Trial Chamber convenes to settle disagreements between the co-prosecutors, between the 
co-investigating judges, and between the co-prosecutors and the co-investigating judges. It also hears 
Pre-Trial appeals. Trial Chamber’s decisions can be appealed at the Supreme Court Chamber. The 
Supreme Court Chamber’s rulings are final. The ECCC applies both Cambodian and international law. 
The ECCC’s judicial offices are led by two co-prosecutors and two co-investigating judges, each pair 
including one Cambodian national and one international. All judges and judicial officers are appointed 
by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy of Cambodia. However international appointments are 
taken from a list provided by the UN Secretary General.39 Following the hybrid pattern, the office of 
administration and major sections such as budget and finance, personnel, security and safety, and 
public affairs also have a Cambodian director and an international deputy.
Modeled after the Cambodian national court system, the ECCC operates in a civil law system. As such, 
the role of the co-prosecutors is to conduct a preliminary investigation and send factual allegations 
constituting crimes and suspects to the co-investigating judges. This is the introductory submission. 
The co-investigating judges examine only the allegations made in the initial submission unless the 
co-prosecutors submit additional facts through supplementary submissions. The co-investigating 
judges have the power to arrest and charge suspects, if deemed necessary. Following notification that 
the investigation is closing, the co-prosecutors make a final submission of their charges. The final 
submission is followed by the co-investigating judges’ closing order which can be appealed by the 
co-prosecutors.40
Once the suspect has been charged and brought into custody, the Defense Support Section’s main role 
is to ensure effective representation of the charged person. In doing so, it provides a list of lawyers 
to defendants, gives legal and administrative support to chosen lawyers, and pays legal fees. Defense 
Support Section also acts as a voice for the defense, and liaises with nongovernmental organizations.41 
In addition to being called as witnesses, victims can participate in the court’s proceedings as 
a complainant or a civil party by submitting a Victim Participation form. The Victims Unit is the 
focal point for victims wishing to participate in the ECCC’s proceedings. It acts as the intermediary 
receiving and processing all forms and transmitting them to the appropriate office. Co-prosecutors are 
responsible for considering the complaints whereas the co-investigating judges or the Trial Chamber, 
as appropriate, assess civil party applications. 
39 The information in this paragraph is drawn from UNAKRT website, available at http://www.unakrtonline.org/ 
01_home.htm.
40	 For	 more	 details	 on	 roles	 and	 procedures,	 see	 “Internal	 Rules	 (rev.	 2),”	 Cambodia:	 Extraordinary	 Chambers	 in	 the	 
Courts of Cambodia, 5 September 2008, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/88/IR_Revision2_ 
05-01-08_En.pdf.
41 The information on the Defense Support Section is drawn from UNAKRT website, available at http://www.unakrtonline.
org/07_defencesupport.htm.
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Any person who witnessed, has knowledge, or was a victim of crimes covered within the jurisdiction 
of the ECCC can file as a complainant. Complaints can be broad and related to any alleged criminal 
acts within the jurisdiction of the ECCC. The co-prosecutors can commence an investigation based 
on a complaint or other information they have gathered. Then victims or anyone else who has 
information that can prove guilt or innocence can be brought as witnesses. Once a person has been 
designated as a witness, the Witness Expert Support Unit is responsible for coordinating protection 
matters at all stages of the proceedings as well as providing support services to protect witnesses 
from emotional and psychological stress. 
To join a case as civil party, the applicant must have suffered harm as a result of crimes committed 
within the ECCC’s jurisdiction and the case must be under investigation by the co-investigating judges. 
In practice, this means that the alleged crime in the application has to be part of the initial or any 
supplementary submission.42 As ruled by the Pre-Trial Chamber, civil parties are considered a party in 
the same way as the prosecution and defense and thus have the right to participate in all parts of 
the proceedings.43 Recently, the Pre-Trial Chamber has ruled that civil parties could only address the 
court through their lawyer or when the court accepts their request to do so, if they are not represented44 
and the internal rules have limited the period for civil party applications.45 Civil parties are entitled 
to legal representation which is assumed either by a Cambodian lawyer or by an international lawyer 
in collaboration with a Cambodian lawyer. Civil parties can also apply through various victim 
associations. Only Civil Parties will be entitled to reparations. 
OuTREach aNd paRTIcIpaTION
Another ECCC unit of importance is Public Affairs which provides information about the court to 
the public, media, and other interested parties. Its main activities include outreach, media relations, 
and audio/video recording of the proceedings.46 The office of Public Affairs has developed booklets, 
posters, stickers, a website, and a newsletter, Court Report, to address the information needs of the 
public at large. The office also meets regularly with the media and participates in activities related to 
42 This is an important point as the initial and supplementary submissions are confidential. For information regarding 
application	 process,	 see	 “Victim	 Participation,	 Practice	Direction	 02/2007/Rev.1,”	Cambodia:	 Extraordinary	Chambers	 
in the Courts of Cambodia, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/160/PD_Victims_Participation_
rev1_En.pdf.
43	 For	more	 details	 on	 the	 ruling,	 see	 “PTC	 decision	 on	 civil	 participation	 in	 provisional	 detention	 appeals,	 Criminal	Case	
File	#002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC01),”	Cambodia:	Extraordinary	Chambers	 in	 the	Courts	of	Cambodia,	available	at	 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/53/PTC_decision_civil_party_nuon_chea_C11_53_EN.pdf.
44	 For	more	 details	 on	 the	 ruling,	 see	 “Public	Directions	 on	Unrepresented	Civil	 Parties’	 Rights	 to	 Address	 the	 Pre-Trail	 
Chamber	 in	 Person,	 Criminal	 Case	 File	 #002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC03),”	 Cambodia:	 Extraordinary	 Chambers	 
in the Courts of Cambodia, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/127/C22_I_69_EN_Directions_ 
on_unrepresented_civil_parties.pdf.
45 Previously, civil party applications were considered until the opening of the proceedings before the Trial Chamber. 
In	the	revised	 internal	rules,	“civil	party	applications	must	be	filed	within	the	Victims	Unit	at	 least	10	(ten)	working	days	 
before	the	 initial	hearing.”	See,	“Internal	Rules	(rev.	2)”	Cambodia:	Extraordinary	Chambers	 in	the	Courts	of	Cambodia,	 
5 September 2008, rule 23, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/internal_rules.aspx.
46 The information on Public Affairs is drawn from the ECCC website, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/public_ 
affairs.aspx.
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the ECCC organized by nongovernmental organizations. However, a lack of funding has prevented 
the office from implementing a comprehensive outreach program. As a result, civil society organizations 
have stepped in to fill the gap.
Several nongovernmental organizations have developed outreach programs related to the court. The 
Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-CAM) has been working on the Khmer Rouge era for 
more than 10 years. Other organizations such as the Cambodian Human Rights and Development 
Association, the Khmer Institute of Democracy, the Center for Social Development, Cambodian 
Defenders Project, Legal Aid of Cambodia, Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee, International 
Center for Conciliation, Youth for Peace, Transcultural Psychosocial Organization, Youth Resources 
Development Program, and others have provided outreach services. Their mandates, target populations, 
and activities vary greatly. However, their activities can be grouped into two broad categories: 
disseminating information and participating in ECCC proceedings. Many of these groups also try to 
“manage”	Cambodians’	 expectations	 towards	 the	 court.	 In	addition,	Open	Society	 Justice	 Initiative	 
hosts monthly meetings ensuring exchange of information among nongovernmental organizations 
and between nongovernmental organizations and the court. 
INFORmaTION dISSEmINaTION
Local nongovernmental organizations have played a key role in disseminating information about the 
court both nationally and internationally. This is done through the distribution of written, visual, 
and	audio	materials;	 facilitating	community	meetings	or	public	 forums;	and	helping	Cambodians	visit	 
the ECCC and commemoration sites. As early as February 2006, the Documentation Center of 
Cambodia began bringing groups of villagers to visit the court and commemoration sites such as 
Tuol Sleng and Choeug Ek. Upon return to their communes, participants would inform their families 
and neighbors.47 The Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association also started a vast 
program of information at the district level informing mixed groups of officials and ordinary citizens 
about the court.48 The Khmer Institute of Democracy has trained Citizen Advisors who, in turn, 
inform people in their community about the work of the court. The Center for Social Development 
has held a series of public forums gathering people at the district level to inform them of the court and 
provide an opportunity to ask questions of court officials and express their expectations. Youth for 
Peace and the Youth Resources Development Program have held information sessions to inform 
young people about the court’s mandate. Nongovernmental organizations have also produced radio 
programs and distributed brochures and booklets. Mekong Films, in collaboration with East-West 
Center, the War Crimes Studies Center at the University of California, Berkeley, and the ECCC, has 
produced a series of films about the court which have aired on national television. Open Forum and 
Open Society Justice Initiative send updates regularly to subscribers of their listservs.
47	Dara	P.	Vanthan	and	Dacil	Q.	Keo,	“February	ECCC	Tour	Report”	 (Phnom	Penh,	Cambodia:	Documentation	Center	of	 
Cambodia, February 2006).
48	 The	Cambodian	Human	Rights	 and	Development	Association,	 “Report	 on	 ECCC/ICC	Training	 Sessions”	 (Phnom	Penh,	 
Cambodia: ADHOC, August 2007), 2.
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paRTIcIpaTION IN Eccc pROcEEdINGS
Since 2007, outreach activities have gradually shifted towards encouraging victim participation. The 
Documentation Center of Cambodia is in the process of gathering 10,000 complaints and civil party 
applications, while member organizations of the Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee49 
focus on collecting mostly civil party applications. As of November 2008, the Victims Unit had received 
2,500 complaints and civil party applications,50 of which 34 civil parties have been accepted.51 
Legal representation is a key issue in the case of civil parties. Several local groups have been working 
in collaboration with international lawyers, yet more resources, expertise, and funding are needed.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE ECCC
Several surveys prior to 2006 showed strong support for the establishment of the ECCC.52 A survey 
by the Open Society Justice Initiative in 2005 found that 62 percent of respondents favored the 
establishment of a court. Fifteen percent said they did not want a court or were not interested, while 
23 percent chose not to respond to the question.53 In February 2008, nineteen months after the 
establishment of the ECCC, the International Republican Institute found that 71 percent of 
Cambodians were aware of the court and 69 percent supported trials of top Khmer Rouge leaders.54 
In October 2008, the Khmer Institute for Democracy compiled results of questionnaires gathered 
through their Citizens Advisor program. Out of 9,074 respondents, 8,502 (94%) supported ECCC 
trials.55 





52 Throughout the last decade, several surveys have been done on public attitudes towards a Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT). 
For	details	on	some	of	the	results,	see	Laura	McGrew,	“Truth,	Justice,	Reconciliation	and	Peace	in	Cambodia”	(Phnom	Penh,	 
Cambodia:	 Funded	 by	 the	Canadian	 Embassy	 (Canada	 Funds),	 February	 2000);	 The	Khmer	 Institute	 of	Democracy,	 
“Survey	on	 the	Khmer	Rouge	Regime	and	 the	Khmer	Rouge	Tribunal	2004,”	available	at	http://www.bigpond.com.kh/ 
users/kid/KRG-Tribunal.htm;	 Suzannah	 Linton, Reconciliation in Cambodia, Documentation Series No.5 (Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia:	 Documentation	 Center	 of	 Cambodia,	 2004),	 and	 William	 Burke-White,	 “Preferences	 Matter:	 Conversations	 
with	the	Cambodian	People	on	the	Prosecution	of	the	Khmer	Rouge	Leadership,”	in	Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: 
Prosecuting Mass Violence before the Cambodian Courts, ed. Jaya Ramji and Beth Van Schaack (New York: The Edwin 
Mellen Press, 2005).
53	 “Strategies	 for	 Reaching	Rural	 Communities	 in	 Cambodia:	Outreach	 for	 the	 Extraordinary	 Chambers”	 (Phnom	 Penh,	 
Cambodia: Open Society Justice Initiative, 2006), 24.
54	 “Survey	of	Cambodian	Public	Opinion”	(Phnom	Penh,	Cambodia:	 International	Republican	 Institute,	 January	27	–	 
February 26, 2008), 42, 44.
55	 Victim	and	Witness	Project	Standards	for	the	ECCC	and	Beyond	Project,	“KID-VWP	Outreach	Survey	on	Knowledge	and	
Interest	in	the	ECCC”	(Phnom	Penh,	Cambodia:	The	Khmer	Institute	of	Democracy,	October	2008),	4.
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As of December 2008, the ECCC has arrested and charged five suspects. On July 30, 2007, 
the co-investigating judges arrested and later charged Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch), former head of 
Tuol Sleng (also known as S21) with crimes against humanity and war crimes. Within four months, 
Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, and Ieng Thirith56 were also arrested and charged 
with similar crimes. In August 2008, the co-investigating judges issued a closing order indicting Duch 
for crimes against humanity and war crimes57 and ordered continued provisional detention until he is 
brought before the Trial Chamber.58 Following appeal by the co-prosecutors, Duch is now indicted 




August 8, 2005, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/115/Closing_order_indicting_Kaing_Guek_
Eav_ENG.pdf.
58 Ibid., 45. The co-prosecutors appealed the charges described in the closing order arguing that they should also include 
murder and torture under domestic law, and joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a theory of liability. The trial is expected 
to	start	during	the	first	quarter	of	2009.	See	“Media	Alert:	The	ECCC	Trial	Progress,”	Phnom	Penh,	ECCC	press	release,	 
October 9, 2008.
59	 See	“Pre-Trial	Chamber	decision	on	 appeal	 against	 closing	order	 indicting	Kaing	Guek	Eav	 alias	 ‘Duch’,”	Criminal	Case	 
File	#001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC01),”	Cambodia:	Extraordinary	Chambers	 in	 the	Courts	of	Cambodia,	available	at	 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/198/D99_3_42_EN.pdf.
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Researchers randomly sampled and interviewed 1,000 adult residents of Cambodia from 9 September 
to 1 October 2008. By design, half the respondents were male and half were female.60 The average age of 
respondents was 39.8 years old (standard deviation, 13.8 years) and a majority of respondents were Khmer 
(95%). Three out of four respondents (74%) had at least some primary education and 71 percent reported 
being literate in at least one language.







Age Groups (%) % Lived under  
Khmer Rouge  
Regime18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 >65
1,000 50.0 39.8 (13.8) 16.7 26.5 25.0 16.7 10.6 4.6 69.3%
Ethnicity (%)
Khmer Cham Viet Chinese Other
94.5 2.1 1.0 0.4 2.0
Religion (%)
Buddhist Muslim Catholic Other
94.5 2.1 1.0 0.4
Over two-thirds of respondents (69%) reported they had lived under the Khmer Rouge regime that 
ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, while 31 percent said they did not live under the regime. 
We found statistically significant differences in attitudes towards the Khmer Rouge (KR) regime, 
justice, and the ECCC among respondents who had lived under the Khmer Rouge regime and those 
who were born after it had left power. This report presents the results disaggregated for those two 
categories. Among the 31 percent respondents who did not live under the Khmer Rouge regime, 
all but four respondents were not yet born during the Khmer Rouge period. The remaining four were 
living outside of Cambodia. 
3. DEMOGRAPHICS
60 The respondents’ demographic profiles are similar to that of the general population according to the 2008 census. The 2008 
census found that Cambodia’s sex ratio is close to 1 (.94). The 2004 inter-censual survey reports that the overall literacy rate 
for the adult population is 73.6%.
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Nationally,	15	percent	of	 respondents	 reported	 that	 they	were	“old	people”	or	“base	people,”	 terms	 for	
those who lived in insurgent zones under the control of the Khmer Rouge and may have contributed in 
some fashion to the revolution. The vast majority joined the Khmer Rouge before March 18, 1975, the 
starting date of the war.61	About	one	in	four	respondents	(23%)	described	themselves	as	“new	people.”	 
These Cambodians generally lived outside of the Khmer Rouge zones or were evacuated from city 
dwellings after the war. They were brought into the revolution, usually by force, after the fall of 
Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge in April 1975.62 
Eight percent of the respondents stated that they were too young at the time to fit into any category. 
About 7 percent said they were in adult, youth, or child mobile units (work units set up by the regime to 
fulfill the need for rural labor). Less than 1 percent stated that they were a member of an ethnic minority 
during the Khmer Rouge period. About 1 percent said they were Khmer Rouge soldiers and 0.3 percent 
said they participated in a militia group. 
TABLE 2: ROLE UNDER THE KR REGIME
Percentage of respondents







Khmer Rouge Soldier 0.9
Ethnic Minority 0.5




Khmer Rouge Cadre 0.1
Don’t Know 8.6
61 Elizabeth Becker, When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1986), 226–29.
62 Ibid.
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63 See Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime	(Yale	University	Press,	2000),	and	Kiernan,	“The	Demography	of	Genocide	in	Southeast	
Asia.	The	Death	Tolls	in	Cambodia,	1975-79,	and	East	Timor,	1975-80,”	Critical Asian Studies (2003), 35/4: 585–97.
64	Henri	Locard,	“The	Khmer	Rouge	Prison	System,”	in	Khmer Rouge History & Authors: From Stalin to Pol Pot—Towards 
a Description of the Pol Pot Regime (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: ADHOC and Center for Social Development, January 2007).
65 David Chandler, Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1999), 6.
66	 Vinck	P,	Pham	PN,	Stover	E,	Weinstein	HM,	“Exposure	to	War	Crimes	and	its	Implications	for	Peace	Building	in	Northern	
Uganda,”	Journal	of	the	American	Medical	Association	(JAMA)	(2007)	298/5:	543–54;	Pham	PN,	Weinstein	HM,	Longman	
T.	“Trauma	and	PTSD	symptoms	in	Rwanda:	implications	for	attitudes	towards	justice	and	reconciliation,”	Journal of the 
American Medical Association (JAMA) (2004), 292/5: 602–12.
EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE 
During the four years of the Khmer Rouge regime, between 1.7 and 2.5 million Cambodians died 
from execution, torture, starvation, overwork, and sickness.63 A vast prison system was instituted 
across the country. Although it is difficult to estimate the number of prisoners, it could reasonably 
be in the range of 400,000 to 600,000 people.64 At Tuol Sleng prison in Phnom Penh alone, at least 
14,000 people were tortured and executed.65
Our earlier studies suggest that exposure to violence influences attitudes towards peace and justice.66 
To better understand factors influencing respondents’ knowledge, perception, and attitudes towards 
the Khmer Rouge regime and the ECCC, this survey assessed exposure to violence during and after 
the Khmer Rouge held power. Eighty percent of respondents in our survey considered themselves 
victims of the Khmer Rouge. Nearly all those who lived under the Khmer Rouge regime identified 
themselves as victims (93%), while half (51%) of those who did not live under the regime said they 
were victims.
TABLE 3: VICTIM STATUS





Do you consider yourself a victim of the Khmer Rouge Regime?  
(% yes)
50.7 92.5 79.7
4. EXPERIENCE, KNOWLEDGE, AND ATTITUDES 
 TOWARDS THE KHMER ROUGE REGIME
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Among respondents who lived under the Khmer Rouge regime, the survey found over two-thirds 
reported having experienced starvation/lack of food (82%), lack of shelter (71%), personal property 
stolen or destroyed (71%), and forced evacuation (69%). Approximately one in four respondents 
reported having been tortured (27%) or having witnessed torture (30%) and/or killings (22%). 
Many respondents said they had been forced into labor (63%) and 61 percent were separated from 
family members. Fewer reported having been abducted for over a week (8%), forced to physically 
harm someone (2%), and/or forced to kill someone (2%). 
Since the conflict and violence persisted after the Khmer Rouge regime was forced from power, the 
survey also assessed exposure to violence after the Khmer Rouge regime among all respondents. 
Reported frequencies of exposure to violence were always lower after the Khmer rouge regime 
compared to during the Khmer Rouge regime, with the exception of becoming disabled as a result of 
combat, injury due to landmine or unexploded ordnance (1.7% during, 2.1% after), and rape or 
other sexual violence (0.6% during, 0.9% after).67 Respondents who lived under the Khmer Rouge 
regime are significantly more likely to have been exposed to violent events.











































Starvation / lack of food
Lack of shelter
Personal property confiscated, stolen, destroyed
Forced evacuation




Beating and/or mutilation to the body
Disability due to combat or landmine
Rape or other sexual abuses or humiliation
Forced labor
Being kidnapped/abducted for over a week
Other forced separation from family members
Forced to physically harm someone
Forced to betray
Forced to kill someone




During the Khmer Rouge Regime* After the Khmer Rouge Regime**
* Only among those who lived during the Khmer Rouge Regime (n=693, 69.3% of the sample)
** Among the entire sample (n=1,000, 100%)
67	 There	 is	 anecdotal	 evidence	 substantiating	 that	 rape	and	other	 sexual	abuse	happened	 frequently	during	 the	KR;	most	of	 
the victims were executed. See Nakagawa Kasumi, Gender-Based Violence During the Khmer Rouge Regime. Stories of 
Survivors from the Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979),	 (Phnom	 Penh:	 June	 2007).	 See	 also,	 “Victim	 of	 Khmer	Rouge	 
sexual	 abuse	 seeks	 justice,”	 International	 Herald	 Tribune,	 September	 3,	 2008,	 available	 at	 http://www.iht.com/articles/
ap/2008/09/03/asia/AS-Cambodia-Khmer-Rouge.php.
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KNOWLEDGE OF THE KHMER ROUGE REGIME AND TRUTH SEEKING
KNOWLEdGE
Nearly thirty years after the end of the Khmer Rouge regime, two-thirds of the current population 
of Cambodia is estimated to have escaped the violence and abuses of that period: 68 percent of the 
population is 29 years old or younger.68 Scholars and practitioners have pointed to the lack of public 
education policies to examine the past in Cambodia, resulting in limited knowledge about the 
Khmer Rouge, especially among the country’s youngest citizens.69 
Four out of five respondents (81%) in our survey who did not live under the Khmer Rouge regime 
described their knowledge of that period as poor or very poor. Six percent said that the primary 
source of knowledge about the Khmer Rouge was school.70 Media also played only a minor role, 
including radio (6%), television (1%), and newspapers (1%). For most (84%), the main source of 
information was family and friends. However, 69 percent of those who did not live during the 
Khmer Rouge period rarely or never spoke about the regime.
FIGURE 3: KNOWLEDGE AND SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE KHMER ROUGE REGIME
In contrast, about one-third (37%) of those who lived under the Khmer Rouge regime described 
their knowledge of that period as poor or very poor while about one-third (32%) described their 
knowledge as good (20%) or very good (12%).71 Eighty percent said that their main source of 
68 Computed by the authors using projected population data for 2004 from the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) of 
Cambodia.
69 See for example S. Linton, Reconciliation in Cambodia (2004).
70 Very little is currently taught in school about the Khmer Rouge regime. However, the government in collaboration with 
the Documentation Center of Cambodia is currently working on a textbook and training program for teachers.
71 The poor or very poor level of knowledge even among those who lived under the Khmer Rouge may be explained by the 
climate of secrecy with which the regime surrounded itself. It is likely that people knew about living conditions at their 
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information about the regime was based on their own experience, while 17 percent mentioned family 
and friends. School (1%) and media (radio 1%, television 1%) were rarely mentioned among the main 
sources of information. This group spoke more frequently about the Khmer Rouge regime compared to 
those who did not live through it, but still 40 percent of them rarely or never spoke about it. 
TRuTh SEEKING
The limited knowledge of the Khmer Rouge regime may influence how meaningful the proceedings of 
the ECCC are for the Cambodian population. On one hand, the trials could be of no concern to those 
who do not consider the Khmer Rouge period as an integral part of their history. On the other hand, 
the trials may open a dialogue and generate interest in learning more about the Khmer Rouge regime. 
Seventy-seven percent of all respondents said they wanted to know more about what happened during 
the Khmer Rouge regime, while 85 percent of those who did not live under the Khmer Rouge regime 
wanted to learn more. When asked about the value of truth seeking, 86 percent of respondents 
believed establishing the truth was necessary. Sixty-four percent agreed with the statement that 
people could not reconcile their differences without knowing the truth about what happened. Most 
respondents disagreed with the proposition that it was too late to learn what happened 
(74% disagreed), that a written historical record was not necessary (81% disagreed), or that what 
happened was already known (65% disagreed). 
Results among those who lived and those who did not live under the Khmer Rouge regime were 
similar, suggesting a desire for the truth and education about what happened during the Khmer 
Rouge regime. However, only half (50%) of respondents would be willing to talk openly in a public 
setting such as a court or a public hearing about what they or their family experienced during the 
Khmer Rouge regime. 
TABLE 4: TRUTH SEEKING
When asked about which mechanisms would be appropriate to establish the truth, nearly half of 
respondents (45%) stated they did not know. The remaining respondents recommended trials (14%), 
dialogue with victims (12%), a truth commission (8%), or allowing people to talk freely (7%).
It is necessary  
to find the truth  
about what  
happened during  
the Khmer Rouge 
regime
People cannot  
reconcile without 
knowing the truth  
of what happened  
during the Khmer 
Rouge regime
(% agree) (% agree)
85.5 64.2
It is too late to 
learn about  
what happened 
during the  
Khmer Rouge 
regime
A written  
historical record  
of what happened  
in Khmer Rouge  
is NOT  
necessary
We know  
what happened 
already so it is  
unnecessary to  
do any further 
inquiry
(% disagree) (% disagree) (% disagree)
74.4 81.3 64.5
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ATTITUDES TOWARDS FORMER MEMbERS OF THE KHMER ROUGE 
Recognition and acknowledgement of past crimes are often necessary steps for social reconstruction and 
reconciliation.72 The survey results presented above suggest that there is a general lack of knowledge 
and understanding among respondents about what happened during the Khmer Rouge regime. 
The survey further examined Cambodians’ perceptions of the Khmer Rouge. 
LIVING TOGEThER
Respondents characterized reconciliation as the absence of violence and conflict (56%) and as unity and 
living together (33%). Some respondents also mentioned communicating and understanding each other 
(9%) and good education (5%). Eight percent stated they did not know how to define reconciliation.
The survey asked respondents about their level of comfort interacting in various social settings with 
former Khmer Rouge members. Despite the various reconciliation programs and activities implemented 
by the government and civil society,73 one third to one half of the respondents claimed they were 
uncomfortable interacting with former members of the Khmer Rouge in various situations as illustrated 
in FIGURE 4. The responses show they were most comfortable going to the same pagoda or having 
their children attend the same school as children of former Khmer Rouge children. Respondents were 
least comfortable living in the same household or same community and having their children marry 
children of a former Khmer Rouge. The responses did not statistically differ between those who lived 
under the Khmer Rouge and those who did not. 
FIGURE 4: ATTITUDES TOWARDS FORMER KHMER ROUGE
72 See, for example, Lederach JP, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 29.
73	 For	examples	of	reconciliation	programs	and	activities	in	Cambodia,	see	Laura	McGrew,	“Transitional	Justice	Approaches	 
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Four out of five respondents in our survey said they harbored feelings of animosity towards those Khmer 
Rouge members who were responsible for violent acts. Seventy-one percent said they wanted to see them 
suffer in some way. A third said they wished they could take revenge (37%) against former Khmer Rouge 
and that they would do so if they had the opportunity (40%). However, one third of respondents (36%) 
said they had forgiven the Khmer Rouge. Feelings of hatred were more frequent among those who lived 
under the Khmer Rouge regime compared to those who did not. Likewise, forgiveness was less frequent 
among those who lived under the Khmer Rouge regime compared to those who did not.
The prevailing belief system of respondents might explain the apparent contradiction between these 
feelings of animosity and forgiveness. About 94 percent of respondents considered themselves 
Buddhists. Forgiveness is a central part of Buddhist teaching, affecting one’s mind and karma. One 
tenet	 of	 Buddhist	 teaching	 is	 that	 “vindictiveness	 is	 not	 ended	 by	 being	 vindictive.”	 Buddhism	 also	 
aims	at	“[bringing]	the	disturbed	minds	of	both	perpetrators	and	their	victims	back	to	a	state	of	moral	 
and	 spiritual	 calm,	 and	 to	 reconfigure	 the	 natural	 order”74	 In	 that	 sense,	 “forgiveness”	 is	 related	 to	 
coming to terms with one’s past experiences, calming down, or putting aside negative feelings75 rather 
than being associated with past wrongdoers. When asked about forgiveness, that understanding of 
the concept could have influenced respondents’ responses. From a Buddhist perspective, this does not 
contradict feelings of anger or hatred resulting from past experiences and fueled by attitudes and 
negative	stereotypes	towards	the	Khmer	Rouge	who	are	seen	as	“the	enemy.”76 Thus, on a daily basis, 
people are still experiencing anger although some also recognize the need to forgive. It is also possible 
that the apparent contradiction reflects the difficulty of generalizing findings to all former members 
of the Khmer Rouge. People could forgive individual Khmer Rouge but still have feelings of 
anger towards the leaders or the Khmer Rouge violence in general. 
TABLE 5: HATRED AND FORGIVENESS





Feelings of hatred towards those KR responsible for violence? (% yes) 79.1 84.6 82.9
Wish you could take revenge on those responsible? (% yes) 34.3 38.1 37.0
Would seek revenge on the Khmer Rouge if you could? (% yes) 40.7 39.3 39.7
Wish to see those responsible hurt or miserable? (% yes) 70.8 71.8 71.5
Have forgiven the Khmer Rouge top leaders? (% yes) 42.2 32.6 35.5
To explore further the theme of forgiveness, researchers asked respondents what needed to happen 
before they could forgive the top leaders of the Khmer Rouge. The most common answer was the need 
for punishment (39%). Punishment was more frequently mentioned among those who lived under 
the Khmer Rouge regime (42%) compared to those who did not (33%). At the same time, one in five 
74 Ian Harris, Buddhism under Pol Pot, Documentation Series No. 13 (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Documentation Center of 
Cambodia, 2007), 240.
75 S. Linton, Reconciliation in Cambodia, 21.
76 Ibid., 22.
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respondents said nothing could be done to make them forgive the Khmer Rouge top leaders. 
Compensation was mentioned by 5 percent of respondents, and most frequently among those who 
did not live under the Khmer Rouge regime (10%).
TABLE 6: CONDITIONS FOR FORGIVENESS
What needs to happen before you can forgive  
the Khmer Rouge top leaders?





Nothing, I cannot forgive them (%) 19.9 23.9 22.8
They must be punished (%) 33.1 41.8 39.4
They must confess, tell the truth (%) 4.5 12.3 10.2
They must apologize (%) 10.9 5.4 6.9
They must confess, apologize, and show remorse (%) 7.7 4.9 5.6
They must compensate us (%) 10.0 3.7 5.4
They must be tortured like people suffered (%) 3.5 1.7 2.2
They must show remorse for what they did (%) 1.7 1.2 1.3
Other (%) 3.9 1.7 2.3
Don't know (%) 4.8 3.5 3.8
ACCOUNTAbILITY
The previous sections suggest that Cambodians remain divided over the presence in their communities 
of those former Khmer Rouge members who were responsible for violent acts, and that forgiveness, 
if at all possible, must be preceded by some form of punishment. We found that nine out of ten 
respondents believed it is important to hold accountable those responsible for what happened during 
the Khmer Rouge regime. When asked in more general terms, over half of respondents (55%) believed 
only the person who directly killed their family, relatives, and friends should be held accountable.
However, when asked to specify who should be held accountable, about half (51%) mentioned Khmer 
Rouge leaders or officials, and 20 percent mentioned the Khmer Rouge regime in general. Respondents 
frequently provided specific names, including individuals already deceased, currently in jail, or serving 
in public positions. Nearly one-quarter (24%) identified Pol Pot, the KR top leader, 11 percent 
mentioned one or more of the five Khmer Rouge leaders currently in custody (Kaing Guek Eav, a.k.a. 
“Duch”;	Nuon	Chea;	 Ieng	Sary;	 Ieng	Thirith;	and	Khieu	Sampan),	and	10	percent	stated	Chhit	Choeun	 
(“Ta	Mok”),	 a	 senior	Khmer	Rouge	 leader.	 Some	 respondents	mentioned	Khmer	Rouge	 cadres	 (6%),	 
and foreign countries that supported the Khmer Rouge regime (2%). Respondents mentioned the 
current Cambodian government (58%), the international community (18%), the national judicial 
system (17%), and the ECCC (9%) as institutions that should be in charge of holding these 
individuals accountable. 
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The responses to questions of who should be responsible seem to contradict the response that only the 
person who killed their relatives or friends should be held accountable. The discrepancy could be related 
to the way the questions were phrased. The respondents may believe that the Khmer Rouge leaders are 
generally responsible for killing their relatives and want to hold them accountable. Thus when asked in an 
open-ended manner, they mentioned Khmer Rouge leaders/officials and some specific names. However, 
when asked specifically if they believe only the person who killed their family or friends should be held 
accountable they responded yes.
TABLE 7: ACCOUNTABILITY





Is it important to hold accountable those responsible for what  
happened during the Khmer Rouge regime? (% yes)
90.3 90.5 90.5
Do you believe only the person who killed your relatives or  
friends should be held accountable? (% yes)
58.3 53.5 54.9
Who should be held  
accountable?
KR leaders/officials (%) 43.2 54.5 51.0
Pol Pot (deceased) (%) 16.6 27.1 23.9
Khmer Rouge regime (%) 19.8 19.9 19.9
The 5 currently arrested* (%) 7.7 12.9 11.3
Ta Mok (deceased) (%) 6.8 10.6 9.5
KR Cadres/Local Officials (%) 1.9 7.8 6.0
Those who gave orders for murder/torture (%) 2.0 2.5 2.3
Those who directly killed someone (%) 2.9 1.7 2.1
Foreign countries who supported KR (%) 0.7 2.0 1.6
Other (%) 0.4 1.5 1.2
Don't know (%) 23.5 8.9 13.4
*Kaing	Guek	Eav,	aka	“Duch”;	Nuon	Chea;	Ieng	Sary;	Ieng	Thirith;	and	Khieu	Sampan
Data on exposure to violence presented earlier in this report are consistent with other studies of 
serious violations of human rights committed by the Khmer Rouge regime.77 Respondents interviewed 
in our survey said the Khmer Rouge should be held accountable for killings (80%), starving the 
population (63%), forced labor (56%), torture (33%), separation of families (14%), absence of freedom 
of expression (6%), and lack of health care (6%). Respondents had the opportunity to provide more 
than one response and on average, those who lived under the Khmer Rouge regime provided more 
answers than those who did not. This pattern of responses reflects the lack of knowledge 
about what happened during the Khmer Rouge regime among those who did not live through it. 
77	 Joop	T.	V.	M.	de	 Jong,	 et	 al.,	 “Lifetime	Events	 and	Posttraumatic	 Stress	Disorder	 in	4	Post-conflict	 Settings,”	 Journal of 
the American Medical Association (JAMA) (2001), 286/5: 555–62.
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TABLE 8: WAR CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY
What happened under the Khmer Rouge regime that people  
should be held accountable for?





Killing (%) 77.1 80.6 79.5
Starvation (%) 47.9 69.8 63.1
Forced labor (%) 45.9 60.7 56.2
Torture (%) 29.7 33.7 32.5
Separation of family members (%) 11.3 14.7 13.7
No freedom of expression (%) 6.2 6.4 6.4
Lack of medical care (%) 4.3 7.0 6.2
Confiscating/ destroying properties, livestock, land (%) 5.9 5.9 5.9
Evacuating people (%) 1.8 6.3 4.9
Forcing children to be part of the army (%) 0.8 3.2 2.5
No schooling (%) 1.2 2.8 2.3
No religious practice (%) 0.8 2.8 2.2
Other (%) 5.1 8.5 7.3
Don't know (%) 11.9 4.2 6.5
To better understand what respondents meant by accountability, researchers asked what, if anything, 
should happen to perpetrators. One in two respondents (49%) said they should be put on trial. 
Respondents frequently talked of punishment. Twenty-three percent said they should be punished, 
12 percent said they should be put in prison, 12 percent said they should be killed, and 6 percent 
wanted them to be tortured. Some respondents wanted those responsible to confess their crimes (5%), 
tell the truth (5%), or apologize (3%). 
TABLE 9: ATTITUDE TOWARDS THOSE RESPONSIBLE
What would you like to see happen to those who are responsible  
for what happened during the Khmer Rouge regime?





Put them on trial (%) 45.6 50.4 48.9
Punish them (%) 24.6 22.0 22.8
Put them in prison (%) 11.9 12.7 12.4
Kill them (%) 10.4 12.7 12.0
Torture them (%) 5.0 6.0 5.7
Have them confess their crimes (%) 3.0 5.5 4.7
Have them speak the truth, explain why (%) 3.4 5.9 5.1
Have them apologize (%) 1.9 2.7 2.5
Re-educate them (%) 2.7 2.1 2.3
Forgive/Pardon (%) 0.4 1.5 1.2
Other (%) 1.9 1.9 1.9
Nothing (%) 6.9 7.1 7.0
Don't know (%) 3.2 3.0 3.1
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PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
The survey results suggest that the Cambodian people want the leaders of the Khmer Rouge who commit-
ted atrocity held accountable. Respondents indicated the best mechanisms for the task were the Govern-
ment of Cambodia and the national court system. However when more specific questions were raised, 
most of the respondents indicated apprehension towards the national courts. 
For respondents, justice meant revealing/establishing the truth (43%) and being fair (37%), enforcing and 
respecting existing laws (15%), and knowing who is right and wrong (9%). One out of eight respondents 
could not define justice (13%). Asked more specifically about the Cambodian court system, respondents’ 
views were somewhat ambiguous. Only 36 percent said they trusted the Cambodian court system and 
37 percent said they trusted Cambodian judges. Less than half of respondents agreed with the proposi-
tion that justice is the same for everyone (44%), or that Cambodian judges treat everyone equally (40%). 
Sixty-one percent said going to court meant paying bribes to judges. Over three-quarters of respondents 
also said that going to court was too expensive (82%) and that involving the police meant paying a fee 
(77%). Those results are consistent with established reports on corruption and lack of independence of the 
judicial sector.78 How Cambodians perceive the national court system may in turn affect how they view 
the ECCC. 
TABLE 10: PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE AND COURTS







Justice is the same for everyone 44.2 25.1 30.6
Cambodian judges treat everyone equally according to the law 39.9 32.3 27.9
Police treats everyone the same way 35.2 27.9 36.9
I trust the Cambodian court system 36.1 38.2 25.7
I trust Cambodian judges 36.8 39.6 23.6
Officials who commit crimes go unpunished 35.1 22.8 42.1
Going to court means paying bribes to the judge 60.7 21.6 17.7
Going to court is too expensive 81.6 11.2 7.1
Involving the police when I have a conflict means having to pay a fee 77.3 10.5 12.2
Going to court means losing face 41.9 18.9 39.2
78 See, for example, Center for International Development & Conflict Management, Polity IV Country Report 2003: Cambodia, 
and	Leuprecht,	“Continuing	Patterns	of	Impunity	in	Cambodia,”	26.
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79 This is consistent with similar findings in conflict situations in eastern Congo and northern Uganda, with basic needs and 
livelihood concerns superseding justice and accountability as priorities. See Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck, Eric Stover, 
Andrew Moss, Marieke Wierda, and Richard Bailey, When the War Ends: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about 
Peace, Justice and Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda and Patrick Vinck, Phuong Pham, Suliman Baldo, and Rachel 
Shigekane, Living with Fear: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice, and Social Reconstruction in 
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.
The perception of the Cambodian court system may be explained by the respondents’ experience with 
courts. Eight percent of respondents reported having experienced conflicts or disputes of some sort 
within their community over a twelve-month period prior to the survey. These conflicts were most 
frequently related to land issues (41%), domestic disputes (26%), or conflict with neighbors (26%) and 
were usually resolved by the village chief (55%), the family (31%), or the commune council (28%). The 
police intervened to resolve the conflict in 8 percent of the cases and provincial courts were mentioned 
as being involved in 7 percent of the cases.
JUSTICE AND CURRENT PRIORITIES
While respondents viewed accountability as important and frequently wanted to see former Khmer 
Rouge tried and punished for past crimes, justice was not a priority for most respondents.79 Rather 
respondents said their priorities were jobs (83%), services to meet basic needs including health (20%), 
and food (17%). When asked what the priorities of the government should be, justice was again 
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When given more specific choices between priorities, three out of four respondents (76%) said it was 
more important to focus on problems Cambodians face in their daily lives than to address crimes 
committed during the Khmer Rouge regime. Over half (53%) of the respondents would rather spend 
money on something other than the ECCC. Those who did not live under the Khmer Rouge regime 
said more frequently that spending should be used to tackle current problems compared with those 
who lived under the regime. This suggests the importance given to the trials at the ECCC is different 
among those two groups. 
Those results do not suggest that the government and international community should not pursue justice 
for past crimes in Cambodia, but rather highlight the need to invest more broadly in human development, 
social justice, and the national court system. Indeed, the perception and potential impact of the Khmer 
Rouge trials would be undermined if they are seen as disconnected from daily concerns and priorities of 
the Cambodian people. The following chapters examine respondents’ perceptions and attitudes about 
justice and the ECCC.
TABLE 11:  JUSTICE AND PRIORITIES
Which is more important: To focus on problems  
Cambodians face today or address crimes committed during  








Today (%) 83.3 73.2 76.3
Khmer Rouge (%) 15.4 25.2 22.2
Don't know (%) 1.3 1.6 1.5
If you could choose, would you spend money on the ECCC  








ECCC (%) 43.8 49.0 47.4
Something else (%) 56.2 51.0 52.6
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KNOWLEDGE OF THE ECCC
Respondents in our survey said they had little experience with Cambodian courts and often distrusted 
judges and the courts in general. Before inquiring about perceptions of the ECCC, researchers assessed 
respondents’ knowledge of it. Nationally, 39 percent of respondents had no knowledge of the ECCC, 
while 46 percent had only limited knowledge. Respondents who did not live under the Khmer Rouge 
regime reported more frequently having no knowledge of the ECCC compared to those who lived 
under the Khmer Rouge Regime (50% and 34%, respectively). 





















To better evaluate knowledge about the ECCC, all respondents were asked whether the ECCC 
was international only, national only or a mixed system with Cambodians and international 
judges and staff. Nationally, 53 percent of respondents adequately described it as a mixed system. 
Respondents who lived under the Khmer Rouge regime were more likely to provide the correct 
answer compared to those who did not (55% vs. 49%), but they were also more likely to say it was 
international only (14%). 
6. PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES AbOUT  
 THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMbERS IN THE COURTS  
 OF CAMbODIA
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The questionnaire further asked if respondents could accurately state how many people had been 
arrested and were awaiting trial at the time of the survey. Nationally, only 10 percent correctly 
answered that five individuals had been arrested and were awaiting trials. A majority simply did 
not know (54%). Those who provided an answer (46% of respondents) were further asked to name 
those who had been arrested and were awaiting trial. Many respondents were able to identify 
Khieu	 Samphan	 (57%),	 Ieng	 Sary	 (47%),	Kaing	Guek	Eav,	 alias	 “Duch”	 (36%),	Nuon	Chea	 (35%),	 
and less frequently Ieng Thirith (18%). However, 45 percent also named individuals who were not 
arrested and awaiting trials and most were unable to name all five (82%). Nationally, when we 
include those who were unable to say how many had been arrested, this means that only 3 percent 
of respondents were able to identify the five individuals currently awaiting trial without any errors. 
The results show differences between those who lived under the Khmer Rouge regime and those 
who had not: less than one percent (0.2%) of those who had not lived under the Khmer Rouge 
regime were able to identify the five individuals awaiting trial compared to 5 percent among those 
who had lived under the Khmer Rouge. 








Correctly identified mixed nature of the ECCC (%) 48.9 55.3 53.3
Correctly identified number awaiting trial at the ECCC (%) 3.0 12.4 9.6
Correctly named the 5 individuals awaiting trials with no errors (%) 0.2 4.7 3.3
The results suggest that knowledge of the ECCC remains limited. Although over half the respondents 
were able to identify correctly the nature of the court, few were able to provide more detailed 
information such as the number and names of those awaiting trials. The finding that knowledge 
about the ECCC was higher among those who lived during the Khmer Rouge regime may reflect 
a stronger interest to find out about the ECCC among that group. Additional questions examined 
respondents’ sources of information and contact with programs aimed at informing the public 
about the work of the ECCC.  
OUTREACH AND MEDIA
Nationally, 64 percent of respondents reported never having heard about the ECCC during the 
month prior to the survey, 20 percent had heard about it less than once a week, and 15 percent 
had heard about it once a week or more frequently. Among those who had heard about the ECCC 
at least once over the one-month period prior to the survey, the main sources of information were 
radio (80%), television (44%), family/friends (15%), and newspapers (11%). Few respondents heard 
about the ECCC from posters or booklets (3%), NGOs (3%), or commune councilors (2%). 
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How often have you heard  
about the ECCC in the last 
month?
Never (%) 76.8 58.5 64.1
Less than once a week (%) 13.3 22.3 19.6
Once a week or more (%) 9.1 17.6 15.0
Don’t know (%) 0.8 1.6 1.4
Main sources of  
information:
Radio (%) 74.4 81.6 80.2
Television (%) 40.6 44.4 43.6
Family/Friends (%) 22.7 13.4 15.2
Newspapers (%) 10.1 11.7 11.4
NGO (%) 3.6 2.6 2.8
Poster or booklet (%) 1.6 3.0 2.7
Commune councilors (%) 0.0 2.4 2.0
Other (%) 3.8 2.3 2.6
Among those who had heard of the ECCC, media were an important source of information. However, 
respondents seem to be apprehensive about the media. All of the respondents were asked to rank their 
level of trust in radio, television, and newspapers. Television and radio appeared to be more trusted 
sources of information than newspapers. In addition, about 41 percent of respondents believe journalists 
are either extremely or quite a bit free to report openly about social and political issues in Cambodia. 
Nearly	the	same	percentage	believed	that	journalists	are	only	“moderately”	free	to	report	openly.	
TABLE 14: RESPONDENTS’ TRUST IN MEDIA SOURCE AND PERCEPTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Not at all A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely
Trust radio (%) 1.8 8.9 46.0 23.7 19.7
Trust television (%) 1.9 9.3 44.8 23.5 20.4
Trust newspapers (%) 1.6 11.2 57.0 16.2 14.0
Believe journalists are free 
to report openly about 
social and political issues in 
Cambodia (%)
1.9 11.8 45.1 22.8 18.4
Nationally, 28 percent of all respondents reported having seen specific TV programs about the ECCC, 
most frequently news reports (45%) and soap operas (16%). One-third of respondents (33%) could not 
specify the type of program. Although less than a third of respondents had seen TV programs about 
the ECCC, about all of them (98%) said they would watch the ECCC proceedings if they were 
broadcasted live on TV. 
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In addition to exposure to the media, respondents were asked whether they had participated in an 
activity related to the ECCC over the twelve-month period prior to the survey. Less than 1 percent of 
those who lived under the Khmer Rouge regime (four individuals) answered positively. None of those 
who did not live under the Khmer Rouge regime participated in an activity related to the ECCC. 
Among those four individuals, two went to public meetings or meetings in the community and two 
went on a trip to Phnom Penh (Tuol Seng, Choeug Ek and/or the ECCC).
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ECCC
pERcEpTIONS OF ThE Eccc
Regardless of whether the respondents lived under the Khmer Rouge regime or not, a majority of 
them (87%) believe the ECCC should be involved in responding to what happened during the 
Khmer Rouge regime (KR). Furthermore, a majority of respondents have a positive perception towards 
the ECCC. About two-thirds believed the judges at the ECCC will be fair and/or that the ECCC is 
neutral. Among the one-third of respondents who did not believe the ECCC was neutral, 30 percent 
explained that no proceeding-related results have been achieved, 23 percent believed the ECCC is 
corrupt (a higher percentage among those who did not live under the Khmer Rouge compared to 
those who did), 20 percent believed the ECCC is associated with the government, and about 15 percent 
believe the process is taking too much time. Only those who lived under the Khmer Rouge regime said 
the ECCC is not neutral because the UN wants to protect the Khmer Rouge (5%) and/or the ECCC 
is associated with foreign countries (3%). 








Should the ECCC be involved in responding to what happened during 
the Khmer Rouge regime? (% yes)
86.1 87.3 86.9
Do you believe the judges at the ECCC will be fair or unfair? (% fair) 69.1 65.6 66.7
Do you believe the ECCC is neutral? (% yes) 69.2 66.2 67.1
If not,  
why not?  
(n=119)
No proceeding-related result has been shown (%) 21.7 32.3 29.7
It is corrupt (%) 34.6 19.2 22.9
ECCC associated with Cambodian government (%) 22.2 19.5 20.2
It takes too much time (%) 10.0 16.7 15.1
Judges working/serving the government (%) 11.5 6.9 8.0
UN wants to protect the Khmer Rouge (%) 0.0 5.2 4.0
It is associated with foreign countries that support KR (%) 0.0 2.6 2.0
It can't sentence KR top leaders due to lack of money (%) 0.0 0.5 0.4
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ExpEcTaTIONS
Respondents seemed to have high expectations for what the ECCC can achieve. Among those who 
have at least a little knowledge of the ECCC (61% of the respondents), one fourth (26%) believed that 
the ECCC would bring justice and one fifth (20%) believed the ECCC would punish those who 
committed atrocities during the Khmer Rouge regime. However, about a third of respondents (37%) 
did not know what the ECCC would achieve. Sixteen percent of those who lived under the Khmer Rouge 
had more frequently no expectations at all or negative expectations such as long trials, no punishment, 
or unrest compared to 9 percent among those who did not live under the Khmer Rouge.
TABLE 16: PERCEPTIONS OF THE POTENTIAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ECCC
What will the ECCC achieve?  








Justice (%) 27.5 25.0 25.6
Punishment (%) 22.2 19.3 20.0
Justice and punishment (%) 1.1 1.4 1.3
Truth, education (%) 0.5 0.8 0.8
Help victims (%) 0.1 1.5 1.2
End return of Khmer Rouge (%) 0.5 0.3 0.4
Long trials (%) 2.5 4.8 4.2
Nothing but long trials (%) 0.0 2.9 2.2
Nothing (%) 5.2 6.5 6.1
No punishment/freedom of accused (%) 1.5 0.6 0.8
Unrest (%) 0.0 0.8 0.6
Don't know (%) 38.8 36.1 36.8
The survey further asked more specific questions on the same topic to all respondents. Almost 
three-quarters (74% of the all respondents) agreed with the statement that the ECCC would bring 
justice to the KR regime victims and/or their families. Most respondents had defined justice as 
establishing truth (43%) and being fair (37%). In addition, 71 percent believed the ECCC would help 
rebuild trust in Cambodia and 67 percent believed that it would help promote national reconciliation. 








ECCC will bring justice to KR victims and/or family (% yes) 76.8 72.1 73.6
ECCC will help rebuild trust in Cambodia (% yes) 75.0 68.9 70.8
ECCC will help promote national reconciliation (% yes) 68.8 66.0 66.9
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Furthermore, among all respondents, 68 percent believed that the ECCC would have a positive effect 
on the victims of the Khmer Rouge and/or their family. Most of those who believe that the ECCC 
would bring a positive effect explained that the court would sentence people who had committed 
crimes (37%) and would establish the truth for victims (35%). This is consistent with how they 
defined justice and their expectation of what the ECCC can accomplish. On the other hand, those 
who considered that the court would not have a positive impact believed the ECCC would not bring 
justice (22%), or that it was operating too slowly and that defendants would die before the trial 
ends (16%). Less than 8 percent mentioned that it would remind victims of the past. About two 
out of five people could not explain why they believe the court will have a negative impact on the 
Khmer Rouge victims and/or their family.








Do you believe that the ECCC 
will have a positive or negative 
impact on KR victims and/or 
their family?
Positive 66.7 69.2 68.4
Negative 9.5 10.9 10.5
Don’t know (%) 23.8 20.0 21.1
If positive impact, why? Will sentence people who committed 
crime to imprisonment (%)
39.3 35.3 36.5
Will find the truth for victims (%) 30.6 36.3 34.6
Will reduce suffering of the victims (%) 9.5 9.7 9.6
Will bring justice / trials (%) 2.7 1.7 2.0
Will end the returning of Khmer Rouge 
regime (%)
1.0 2.4 2.0
Will bring national reconciliation (%) 2.5 1.3 1.7
Arrested Khmer Rouge leaders who 
committed crimes (%)
1.9 0.9 1.2
Other (%) 1.7 4.9 3.9
Don’t know (%) 11.3 8.1 9.0
If negative impact, why? Will not bring justice for the victims (%) 17.3 24.0 22.1
Too slow, leaders will die (%) 10.0 17.8 15.7
Reminds victims of the past (%) 9.0 7.3 7.8
Will bring no achievement (%) 0.0 7.7 5.6
Will affect next generation of Khmer 
Rouge (%)
9.7 1.2 3.6
It is corrupted (%) 5.6 2.3 3.3
It sets peoples' mind on revenge (%) 6.3 0.7 2.3
Too few leaders arrested and awaiting 
trials (%)
0.0 3.6 2.6
Will defame families of Khmer Rouge 
leader (%)
3.4 0.0 0.9
It cannot reduce suffering of the victims (%) 0.0 0.1 0.1
Don't know (%) 38.7 38.4 38.5
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RESpONdENTS’ REcOmmENdaTIONS TO ThE Eccc
Respondents were given the opportunity to make one recommendation to the ECCC. About 34 percent 
of those who lived under the KR and 22 percent of those who did not recommended that the ECCC 
speed up the trials. About 19 percent of those who lived under the KR and about 30 percent of those 
who did not recommended that the ECCC be fair and independent. Overall, about 11 percent 
recommended that the ECCC punish those who committed atrocities during the Khmer Rouge 
regime. Again, these recommendations are consistent with their expectations of the ECCC. 
TABLE 19: RESPONDENTS’ RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ECCC







Speed up trials (%) 22.2 33.7 30.2
Be fair, independent (%) 29.8 18.9 22.2
Punish (imprisonment, death, exile) (%) 8.0 11.8 10.7
Find justice (%) 8.4 7.4 7.7
Find / establish the truth (%) 2.1 4.3 3.6
Forgive Khmer Rouge top leaders (%) 0.9 2.1 1.7
Other (%) 3.4 3.4 3.4
No recommendations (%) 3.1 3.5 3.4
Don't know (%) 22.1 14.8 17.0
paRTIcIpaTION IN Eccc pROcEEdINGS
Based on the survey, none of the respondents reported having been contacted by any organization 
to participate in ECCC proceedings. On the other hand, 2 percent of respondents reported knowing 
how to participate in ECCC proceedings. As of November 6, 2008, the Victims Unit of the ECCC 
had received 2,500 forms. About one-third of these forms were from individuals who wished to 
participate as a civil party against at least one of the accused,80  while the remainder were from 
individuals lodging complaints against the various five defendants. This means that less than 1 percent 
of the population has been contacted by the ECCC or nongovernmental organizations. 
The questionnaire further asked those respondents in what capacity they can participate in ECCC 
proceedings. Among those who knew how to participate, over one-third (42%) said they could 
actively participate by filing a complaint with a nongovernmental organization (21%) or with the 
court (21%). About one in five said they could participate as witnesses (21%) or attend official hearings/
proceedings (18%). Fewer said they could simply visit the court (11%) or did not know (8%). Despite 
the lack of contacts and knowledge on how to participate, over half the respondents (52%) wanted to 
personally participate in ECCC proceedings, given the opportunity. This is consistent with most 
respondents’ desire to know more about the Khmer Rouge and expectations that the court will find 
the truth. Respondents who lived under the Khmer Rouge were slightly less frequently willing to 
participate in the proceedings (51%) compared to those who did not (54%). 
80 As of the end of November, 34 civil parties were accepted. 
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REPARATIONS
When asked generally what should be done for victims of the Khmer Rouge regime and their families, 26 
percent stated that support for agriculture and farming should be provided, 23 percent mentioned social 
services such as health care and counseling, 22 percent mentioned financial support, and 17 percent asked 
that those who were responsible for the violence be punished. Other symbolic gestures, such as apologies 
(3%) and providing justice (2%), were also mentioned. 
























The Internal Rules of the ECCC note that reparations, if granted, will be collective, symbolic, and moral 
and non-financial in nature.81 Symbolic reparations could include erecting statues, building memorials, 
renaming public facilities, establishing days of remembrance, expunging criminal records, exhuming bod-
ies, issuing declarations of death, and conducting reburials. 








Is it important to provide symbolic (moral) reparation to victims of 
the Khmer Rouge or their family? (% yes)
88.1 87.7 87.8
Should reparations be provided 
to individuals or communities as 
a whole or both?
Individual (%)     13.1    10.5  11.3
Community (%)     63.3    70.5  68.3
Both (%)     23.7    19.0  20.5
If there is no reparation provided to the victims/and their family, 
would you accept that? (% yes)
    18.9    29.7 26.4
81	 See	“Internal	Rules	(rev.	2),”	rule	23.
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Most respondents (88%) believe it is important to provide symbolic reparations to victims of the Khmer 
Rouge. Only 26 percent of respondents said they would accept it if no reparations were paid to the vic-
tims or their families. Those who did not live under the Khmer Rouge were less likely to accept that no 
reparations be provided compared to those who lived under the KR. However, the majority (68%) said 
that reparations should be provided to a community as a whole and about 20 percent believed it should 
be provided to both the communities and individuals alike. Interestingly, only 11 percent of respondents 
believe that reparations should be provided to individuals only. Furthermore, those who lived under the 
Khmer Rouge regime were more likely to prefer community reparations than those who did not. 
When asked specifically what kind of reparations should be provided, 20 percent of respondents indicated 
that social services such as health service, education, and psychological counseling should be provided to 
victims. Fifteen percent mentioned infrastructure and 12 percent economic measures. Less than 10 percent 
recommended a memorial, day of commemoration, public events, and museums as symbolic measures. 
With regard to who should pay for reparations, 64 percent stated the government, 22 percent said the 
perpetrators (KR leaders), 10 percent said the international community, 3 percent said the community, 2 
percent mentioned nongovernmental organizations, 1 percent mentioned the ECCC, and 1 percent specifi-
cally stated foreign countries that supported the Khmer Rouge. 





















Public event (ceremonies or burial ceremonies)
Justice (timely and fair trial)
Museum
Movie, song, or books
Livestock, food, and agricultural tools
Confession and apology from perpetrators
Perpetrators go to pagoda and confess wrongdoing
Don't know
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Our principal findings are summarized as follows:
ExpOSuRE TO VIOLENcE
Eighty percent of respondents in our survey 
considered themselves to be victims of the Khmer 
Rouge. Nearly all those who lived under the 
Khmer Rouge regime identified themselves as 
victims (93%), while half (51%) of those who 
did not live under the regime said they were 
victims. Among respondents who lived under the 
Khmer Rouge regime, over two-thirds reported 
having experienced starvation/lack of food (82%), 
lack of shelter (71%), personal property stolen 
or destroyed (71%), and forced evacuation (69%). 
Approximately one in four respondents reported 
having been tortured (27%) or having witnessed 
torture (30%) or killings (22%). Sixty-three 
percent said they had been forced to perform 
labor. Respondents who lived under the Khmer 
Rouge regime were significantly more likely to 
have been exposed to violent events. 
OVERaLL pRIORITIES
Respondents said their priorities were jobs (83%) 
and services to meet basic needs including health 
(20%) and food (17%). When asked what the 
priorities of the government should be, justice 
was seldom mentioned (2%), with the most frequent answers being the economy (56%) and building 
infrastructure (48%). When given more specific choices among priorities, three out of four 
respondents (76%) said it was more important to focus on problems that Cambodians face in their 
daily lives rather than address crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime. 
SuRVEy RESpONdENTS
The average age of survey respondents 
was 39.8 years old (standard deviation, 
13.8 years), with equal numbers of male 
and female. A majority of respondents 
were Khmer (95%). Three out of four 
respondents (74%) had at least some 
primary education. Seventy-one percent 
reported being literate in at least one 
language. 
Over two-thirds of respondents (69%) 
reported they had lived under the Khmer 
Rouge regime, while 31 percent said they 
were born after it had left power. We 
found statistically significant differences 
between these two groups on a range of 
topics regarding the ECCC and the need 
for justice and accountability. This suggests 
that outreach programs for the ECCC 
should be tailored to reflect the needs 
of these two subgroups.
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KNOWLEdGE OF ThE KhmER ROuGE
Nearly thirty years after the end of the Khmer Rouge regime, two-thirds of the population of 
Cambodia never directly experienced the violence and abuses of that period: 68 percent of the 
population is 29 years old or younger. Eight-one percent of respondents in our survey who did not 
live under the Khmer Rouge regime described their knowledge of that period as poor or very poor. 
Most (84%) said their main source of information about the Khmer Rouge was from families 
and friends, while only 6 percent said they acquired it in school. Seventy-seven percent of all 
respondents said they wanted to know more about what had happened during the Khmer Rouge 
regime, while 85 percent of those who did not live under the regime wanted to learn more. 
LIVING WITh FORmER mEmbERS OF ThE KhmER ROuGE
The vast majority of respondents said they still harbored feelings of hatred towards those Khmer Rouge 
members responsible for violent acts. Seventy-one percent said they wanted to see the Khmer Rouge 
suffer in some way. A third said they wished they could take revenge (37%) against former Khmer Rouge 
and that they would do so if they had the opportunity (40%). Forty-seven percent said they were 
uncomfortable living in the same community with former Khmer Rouge members. However, one-third 
of respondents (36%) said they had forgiven the Khmer Rouge. Feelings of hatred were more frequent 
among those who lived under the Khmer Rouge regime compared to those who did not. Likewise, 
forgiveness was less frequent among those who lived under the Khmer Rouge regime compared to 
those who did not.
accOuNTabILITy
Nine out of ten respondents in our survey said that members of the Khmer Rouge should be held 
accountable for the crimes they committed. When asked to specify who should be held accountable, 
half (51%) mentioned Khmer Rouge leaders or officials, and 20 percent mentioned the Khmer Rouge 
regime in general. One-quarter (24%) identified Pol Pot, the deceased Khmer Rouge leader, while 
11 percent mentioned one or more of the five Khmer Rouge leaders currently in custody. Forty-nine 
percent of respondents said Khmer Rouge who committed crimes should be tried in a court of law. 
When asked who should be in charge of holding these individuals accountable, respondents said 
the current Cambodian government (58%), the international community (18%), the national judicial 
system (17%), and the ECCC (9%). 
ExTRaORdINaRy chambERS IN ThE cOuRTS OF cambOdIa 
•	 Knowledge of the ECCC. Thirty-nine percent of the respondents in our survey had no knowledge 
of the ECCC, and nearly half (46%) had only limited knowledge. Among those who had some 
level of knowledge about the ECCC, 53 percent adequately described it as a hybrid court 
comprising national and international judges and staff. However, 82 percent of these respondents 
were unable to name all five accused currently awaiting trial. Of those who had heard about 
the ECCC the main sources of information were radio (80%) and television (44%). Twenty-eight 
percent of these respondents reported having seen specific TV programs about the ECCC, most 
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frequently news reports (45%) and soap operas (16%). The vast majority (98%) said they would 
watch the ECCC proceedings if they were broadcasted live on TV. Finally, less than 1 percent of 
those respondents who had lived under the Khmer Rouge regime had participated in an outreach 
activity related to the ECCC over the twelve-month period prior to the survey.
•	 Perceptions and Expectations of the ECCC. In general, those respondents who were aware of the 
ECCC gave it very high marks. Eighty-seven percent said the court would respond to the crimes 
committed by the Khmer Rouge. About two-thirds (67%) believed the ECCC judges would be fair 
and the court was neutral. Sixty-eight percent believed the ECCC would have a positive effect on 
the victims of the Khmer Rouge and their families. However, there was ambiguity among some 
respondents about the court’s objectivity and integrity. One-third said the court was not neutral 
and, among them, 23 percent felt it was corrupt. Respondents had high expectations of the ECCC. 
	Of	those	respondents	who	had	“a	little	knowledge”	of	the	ECCC,	26 percent said the court would 
bring justice and 20 percent said the court would punish the guilty. However, 37 percent did not 
know what the ECCC would accomplish.   
•	 Recommendations to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Respondents 
who had at least some knowledge of the court were given the opportunity to make one 
recommendation to the ECCC. Consistent with their perceptions and expectations, respondents 
wanted the court to speed up the trials (30%) and for it to be fair and independent (22%). 
Seventeen percent said they did not know what to recommend to the court.
•	 Reparations. ECCC judges have the authority to rule that reparations of a collective, symbolic, 
and moral—but not financial—nature be provided to certain groups of victims (i.e., civil parties). 
Such reparations could include erecting statues, building memorials, renaming public facilities, 
establishing days of remembrance, expunging criminal records, issuing declarations of death, 
exhuming bodies, and conducting reburials. The vast majority of our respondents (88%) said 
reparations should be provided to victims of the Khmer Rouge, and that they should be provided 
to the community as a whole (68%). Over half (53%) said reparations should be in a form 
that affects the daily lives of Cambodians, including social services (20%), infrastructure 
development (15%), economic development programs (12%), housing and land (5%), and 
provision of livestock, food, and agriculture tools (1%).
NaTIONaL cRImINaL JuSTIcE SySTEm
Respondents showed little confidence in the national criminal justice system. Only 36 percent said 
they trusted it, and a slightly higher number (37%) said they trusted Cambodian judges. Less than 
half of respondents (44%) agreed with the proposition that Cambodian justice is for everyone, 
or that Cambodian judges treat everyone equally (40%). Eighty-two percent said going to court 
was too expensive and required bribing judges (82%) or the police (77%).
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Key recommendations to emerge from our findings are as follows:
TO THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMbERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMbODIA
•	 Deal immediately and effectively with allegations of corruption and lack of transparency at the 
ECCC. Among Cambodians who are knowledgeable of the ECCC, there is strong support for its 
work. Survey respondents expressed high expectations that the court will be fair and independent. 
This is good news for the ECCC, but it could easily erode if allegations of corruption continue. 
Respondents showed little confidence in the national criminal justice system because of corruption 
and a lack of trust in court officials. The ECCC should not succumb to the same fate. Moreover, 
the court should ensure that trials are transparent and conducted in a timely fashion.
•	 Greatly expand and improve the outreach efforts of the ECCC. Knowledge of the ECCC nationwide 
should be much higher at this point in time, given that it became operational in 2006. Less than 
1 percent of those who lived under the Khmer Rouge (four individuals) had participated in 
an ECCC-related outreach activity during the 12 months prior to the survey. Public service 
announcements about the court should be broadcast on radio and television. Interviews with 
court judges and staff should be commonplace during the trials to help explain complicated legal 
and judicial concepts to the public. Finally, a weekly summary of trial proceedings—preferably in 
a talk show format that encourages debate—should be aired on both radio and television.
•	 Appoint a staff member to serve as an “educational liaison officer” to donors, nongovernmental 
organizations, and the Cambodian government. The ECCC’s primary obligation, as with all courts, 
is to hold fair and public trials. That said, the court is in a unique position to act as a catalyst for 
educational programs that will connect the court’s activities to Cambodian history. Cambodia’s 
school system has failed to educate young people about the crimes of the Khmer Rouge. Working 
together, the ECCC, donors, nongovernmental organizations, and Ministry of Education should use 
this unprecedented opportunity to create curricular modules combining historical texts and visual 
materials from the forthcoming trials for use in primary and secondary schools. These educational 
products could also serve as part of the court’s legacy. 
•	 Recognize that the vast majority of Cambodians view themselves as direct or indirect victims of 
the Khmer Rouge and desire some form of collective and symbolic reparations. Why this is a pressing 
issue for the ECCC is reflected in the finding that most respondents said it was more important for 
the country to focus on problems Cambodians face in their daily lives than the crimes committed 
by the Khmer Rouge. This suggests that the ECCC must find ways to ground its activities in the 
current concerns and needs of the population. Providing reparations—especially those aimed at 
providing social services and infrastructure development—could help meet this need.
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TO DONORS AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
•	 Find ways to help the ECCC better inform Cambodians about its mandate and activities. Donors 
and nongovernmental organizations have played a critical role in supporting the ECCC on many 
levels, including outreach and training. Yet the data suggests most Cambodians are not aware of 
the court or know very little about its mandate and procedures. It also appears that outreach efforts 
have not been well coordinated. A centralized process with clear guidelines and goals could help 
remedy this situation. 
•	 Continue to provide support to the ECCC in defining what reparations will work in the Cambodian 
context. As noted earlier, Cambodians favor especially those reparations that affect their daily lives. 
One workshop has already been convened in late November 2007 focusing on the history of 
reparations following mass violence and reparations that have worked in post-war settings. 
A follow-up workshop could focus on how to provide victims and their families a voice in the 
process of determining the most appropriate reparations and how to deliver reparations in an 
effective manner. 
•	 Develop a comprehensive plan for promoting discussion in communities where tensions between 
former Khmer Rouge members and the general population are known to be high. The survey 
data suggest that a degree of unspoken hostility lingers in some Cambodian communities over the 
crimes of the Khmer Rouge. Studies in other post-war settings indicate trials can further divide 
communities that have not reconciled their differences. To mitigate the possibility of escalating 
tensions, community-based discussion should be held before and after ECCC judges render 
their verdicts.
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CAMbODIA
•	 Conduct a major review and overhaul of the national criminal justice system that integrates the 
judicial legacy of the ECCC, ends corruption, and institutes transparency, accountability, and 
efficacy. The survey data are clear: Cambodians have little faith in their criminal justice system. 
The ECCC’s presence could provide the opportunity for donors, nongovernmental organizations, 
and the Government of Cambodia to come together and tackle this problem in a meaningful and 
sustainable way. For respondents, justice meant uncovering truth and being fair, enforcing and 
respecting existing laws, and knowing who is right and wrong. Only a few reported that they rely 
on the legal system when faced with disputes. 
•	 Continue to work with the civil society to integrate what happened during the Khmer Rouge 
regime into school history curriculum. As mentioned earlier, Cambodia’s school system has thus 
far failed to educate young people about the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime.
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Phuong Pham and Patrick Vinck led the design and development of the survey in Cambodia in collaboration 
with Mychelle Balthazard and Sokhom Hean. Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck, Mychelle Balthazard, Sokhom Hean, 
and Eric Stover wrote the report.
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